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1. Abstract 
 
Leukel et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that humans are able to perform corrections during 
movement execution in response to subliminal cues presented alone as the sole target with no 
previous priming and with a successive neutral mask. This was demonstrated using a task that 
either required hand reaching to a target button, upward arrow, or stopping the movement in 
response to a downward arrow. The authors used two different protocols. First, a verbalization 
protocol tested for conscious perception (i.e. to identify the percentage of correct responses for 
different display durations based on verbalized answers). In the second protocol (motor reaction 
protocol), the same visual stimuli was provided on a computer screen, but now subjects were 
asked not to verbalize their response but to perform a motor response that was dependent on the 
direction of the displayed arrow (an arrow showing upwards indicated that subjects should press a 
second button whereas a downward arrow indicated not to press the second button).  
The results provided further support for the existence of direct visuomotor circuits which enable 
correct motor behaviour without necessarily involving conscious perception. The observations of 
this study are well in line with previous studies using similar visual priming experiments (Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003), blindsight behaviour (Cowey, 2010) and artificially suppressed visual 
awareness (Christensen, Kristiansen, Rowe, & Nielsen, 2008). After having drawn some links 
between overt sport performances and subliminal visual cueing, we reviewed the most important 
contributions to this field of research.  
We conducted a similar experiment where we tested whether subliminal visual cues alone can 
influence decision making between leftwards or rightwards movements. Leftwards or rightwards 
pointing arrows were presented to participants at twelve different display durations, ranging from 
8.33 ms to 100 ms. In a verbal protocol, subjects were asked to state verbally (and also 
consciously) the orientation of the displayed arrows after pressing a start button. This protocol 
was used in order to determine the duration of the conscious detection threshold. In the motor 
response protocols, subjects were asked to trigger the start of the computer program (pressing a 
start button or triggering a light barrier) and to perform a movement in the direction of the 
displayed arrow that appeared 20 ms after triggering the program. Two different motor protocols 
were used in order to identify possible differences between a simple motor task (pressing buttons) 
and a sports-related task (moving a racket/hockey stick in the correct direction). 
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Our results reveal (fig. 19. pg. 53) no significant difference between the three protocols. This 
means that the present study was not able to identify any differences between a verbalization task 
where conscious perception is necessary and a motor task where conscious perception is not a 
prerequisite for correct decision making. Therefore, the results of the present study do not 
support the findings of previous studies that used a similar experimental design. Reasons and 
possible explanations for the observed findings are discussed. 
 
Preface 
 
I am Swiss man, born in the 20th century. I have enjoyed doing sport since I was a young boy. Over 
the last five years, I have tried to be a scientist during my university studies in sport sciences. This 
is the work that will certify me and give some academic value to what I’ve done in my life till now. 
By introducing this study, I would like to try to explain the connections I see between two of the 
greatest authorities ever in the sport and scientific world respectively. Two men, who seem to 
have more than one link with my country, with the historical period I was born in, and of course 
with the two fields in which I have spent the most time doing in recent years. One is Roger 
Federer, worldwide, a well appreciated athlete, Swiss born like me, just five years before me, and 
also a key figure during my formative years. For me, he is much more than a compatriot to support 
in front of the TV while he’s fighting for victory in the most prestigious international tennis 
tournaments. Billions of people all over the world have been fascinated by this tremendous player, 
million’s of women would like to marry this valorous and sensitive man, thousand’s of young men 
try to imitate him on court, but I suppose that fewer people spend so much time studying Federer 
as I do. I am used to analyzing in detail everything he does, during rallies but also between them, 
as well as observing him when he’s sitting on the bench or when he’s talking at the press 
conference. How does he move, how is he working with his feet, how wide does he keep them 
while hitting, how does he bend his knees while serving, these are just some biomechanical 
examples of my observations while he’s playing points. When he’s walking on the baseline or to 
the bench, I used to try to watch how he is breathing, and what he is doing to recover faster, to 
keep calm and to relax his body. For sure, another thing which excites me is trying to guess what 
he’s thinking about, entering his psychological sphere is something that I would like to be able to 
do. Somehow he is the most open player while talking about his performance, but there is no 
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chance to get in his interview some direct information about his fears or real troubles. 
Nevertheless, on each kind of video I could find about him, showing him off season, during 
charities or in his private life, I always try to capture his nature and his attitude. I cannot really 
explain this obsession for this person, but I can just say that he represents for me the best way to 
be an athlete. Not because of his results, nor because of his playing style. What always strikes me  
again when I see him, is how he seems to love what he’s doing. For a long time, only one 
possibility for me to study him was on TV, till the day he came playing in Fribourg. Here I can point 
to the only real link between Roger Federer and my experience as a sport student, and not only 
because he came to the city where I was studying. I found no ticket for his matches that were all 
sold-out and I felt quite desperate, but at my university mail address I received the proposition to 
work voluntarily for the tournament organisation. This allowed me to see him playing live, a 
possibility that definitively changed my way of conceiving movement and the science of 
movement. 
The other man, the renowned person I’d like to mention in this preface is Albert Einstein, who was 
the most important scientist of the century I was born in, and who also did his  studies in 
Switzerland as I am doing. There was no chance for us to initiate a discussion about Einstein’s 
physics principles; nevertheless, we know that his most famous findings turn around the concepts 
of time and space at the same time. General relativity is the “description of gravity as a geometric 
property of space and time, or spacetime”1. This cheap sentence is quite enough for people who 
know practically nothing about of quantum physics like me, but  it is enough to know that the 
connection between space and time is the key point focused on by Einstein. However, the attempt 
to understand and find a model to explain the nature of space and time, is probably connected 
with the keys of our existence, where human experience is possible only through this. It is also not 
surprising if all of the greatest fields of human thought,  theology, philosophy and of course 
science, crush against the description of spacetime, our reality.  
I used this last sentence in an article I wrote when I came home from Fribourg Forum, after having 
seen Roger live for the first time, precisely during the practice session. Briefly, I said in a few 
columns, that while he moves, this wonderful athlete seems to give a response to the enigmatic 
connection between space and time.   
                                                          
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity 
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Of course, this excited, mystical perception of what Roger does is only acceptable for a passionate 
newspaper article dedicated to his fans. A master’s thesis in sport sciences demands a quick switch 
to a more concrete dimension, necessarily testable through experimental evidence. Fortunately, 
as students with scientific faculties, we have no doubts in taking the following consideration as a 
start point, namely, that everything that an athlete does is scientifically explainable. And if no 
explanation can be found, this is just because of a lack in the method or in the instruments used to 
observe the event. This, because everything an athlete does exists in a concrete world which is 
framed by time and space as the expression of precise effects that are spatially organised and 
timed by his or her body. This is obviously true also for the “divine” Federer. Perhaps it is also true 
that everything a human does at the highest level creates a connection with the absolute. Such 
links seem to happen when performance implies a great connection with the task, making the 
performer unaware of anything else around him. But this kind of sensation is not an exclusive 
possibility given to the greatest athletes or artists or thinkers or mystics. Everybody should 
experience, at last once, this sensation of absolute connection with the action they are 
performing. It is impossible to know whether such feelings really connect us to the unknown, 
absolute, side of our nature. On the other hand, humans usually tend to explain everything they 
are not able to control with the power of reason with mystical arguments. On the other hand, no 
reason will allow us to further discuss a sport performance with such naivety. So let us start by 
using reason and try to explain why bodies that are moving appropriately, congruent to the 
situation, despite highly uncertain situations and spatiotemporal constraints, leave us with a 
feeling of the mysterious.  
 
2. Introduction 
 
2.1. Why unconscious motor control 
 
As a first consideration, we should remember that all human actions directly depends on neuronal 
activations, which are obviously concrete, and that no muscle fiber can be activated without an 
electrical signal stimulating it. Nevertheless, we cannot be aware of those activations and this is 
true for all movement because we cannot perceive that deeply what is happening in our nervous 
system to generate the action. Moreover the famous Libet experiment (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & 
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Pearl, 1983: 73-79) shows us that “the onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several 
hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act.” The absence of awareness at the 
early stages of the beginning of movement suggests that movement can escape our voluntary 
control. Movement can be decided and started in a time delay prior to the moment when we 
report being aware that we have decided and initiated it. Volition and awareness do not have the 
same meaning and such aspects are not necessarily linked. Nevertheless their findings let us 
investigate whether conscious intention to act has just been reported later or whether conscious 
intention is not even involved in decision taking. In fact Libet et al. challenged the concept of free 
will for motor decision and could deny this principle. 
 
2.1.1. Anticipation 
 
Superficially, it is possible to think that in overt sport performances quick appropriate reactions 
are just possible thanks to anticipation. This last concept expects that before the relevant 
information which should trigger the response has been presented or before it is completely 
detectable a specific movement congruent to the situation already begins. For instance, response 
triggering information could be either ball or opponent displacement. Anticipated decision taking 
for movement selection, could also use other features from the presented condition, such as 
triggering factors, namely tactical or technical features which force or induce an opponent to do 
what is expected rather than any different action. Taking advantage of such details is a possibility 
that has been studied by Shim, Carlton, Chow, & Chae, (2005) where players had to respond either 
to a ball machine or to a real shooter. Compared to the machine, real opponents allowed faster 
reaction times indicating that expert hitters are able to use movement-pattern information to 
determine shot selection and to use such information to significantly reduce their response delay 
times. Many studies have proved that elite athletes have higher anticipation capacities than 
novices in different games as the following articles reveal regarding basketball, ice hockey, soccer 
and tennis. Professionals show faster and higher rates of correct anticipation than less trained 
players. Differences between them may come from different visual perceptions (Wu et al., 2013). 
For instance, elite players have longer fixation periods on fewer relevant points in the visual field 
while saccade switches between them are faster (Martell & Vickers, 2004) Recently, this fact has 
also been explained by neuroimaging, whereas “perceptual-cognitive superiority was associated 
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with greater activation of cortical and subcortical structures involved in executive function and 
oculomotor control” (Bishop, Wright, Jackson, & Abernethy, 2013). In the above mentioned 
experiments, participants were always asked to anticipate what was going on. While it was 
discovered that, in this condition, elite players performed better, the authors do not indicate how 
often anticipations occur during a real performance. Interesting research (Triolet, Benguigui, Le 
Runigo, & Williams, 2013) based on several recordings of professional tennis matches, reveals that 
“observable anticipation behaviours in professional tennis occur on between 6.14% and 13.42% of 
the shots played”. Nevertheless, compared to Triolet’s experiment mentioned above, that 
compared reaction time against machine or a real opponent respectively, the concept of 
anticipation is quite different here. Triolet’s anticipation concept is more linked to player 
movement choice based on tactical situations while Shim’s is based on triggering features based 
on an opponents’ movement. This first kind of anticipation occurred almost nine out of ten 
movements to the ball. Other anticipations are also reactions based rather on an opponents’ 
gestures and we suspect this always happens with professionals where their responses take under 
200 ms (but not shorter than 127 ms according to Shim et al., 2005).  
 
2.1.2. Automaticity 
 
To be precise, professionals’ reactions are that quick not only because of using triggering 
information before ball hits occur in an anticipatory way. Expert performer’s skills are also 
automatized; this implies that because of the amount of practice time over their lives, neural 
region activation for specific motor responses are significantly different compared to when they 
began their practice regime or to beginners. Fitt and Posner’s (1967) famous model presents three 
learning stages from “cognitive” to “autonomous” through “associative”. As can be seen in figure 
1, this could be integrated with a modern neuroimaging study (Puttemans, Wenderoth, & 
Swinnen, 2005) which shows the neuronal activation for motor control switching from motor 
cortex rather than to subcortical structures during a period where participants learned a new  
bimanual coordination task. 
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Fig. 1: the link between a theoretical model (M Fitts & I Posner, 1967) and a neuroimaging study 
(Puttemans et al., 2005) of the movement learning stages (Taube W., 2009, handout from the 
“Theory of learning and motor control” course). 
Another experiment (Poldrack et al., 2005) using a serial reaction time task, after “extensive 
behavioral training” also showed decreased activity in bilateral ventral premotor regions, the right 
middle frontal gyrus, and the right caudate body activity in other prefrontal and striatal regions. 
This also implied a decrement in reaction time in all four tasks (four different protocols were 
presented to participants, namely single or dual task both in randomized or sequence trial 
succession).  
  
Fig. 2: post training decrement of the reaction times in all four task types [ST = single task, DT = 
dual task, Rand = randomized, Seq= sequence] (Poldrack et al., 2005). 
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Of course, despite the modern machinery, neuroimaging still cannot be displayed while an athlete 
is playing on court. Nevertheless, by reason of faster reaction times, we can deduce that expertise 
involves less cortical contribution than what is needed in novices players, as happens in 
experimental motor actions.  
Anticipation and automaticity are two principles that also make skilled players react with very 
short delays. In addition, when they are not relying on anticipation due to particular tactical 
situations, reactions between 130 and 200 ms for tennis have been noted (Shim et al., 2005). -This 
means that professionals start moving to the ball with a very short delay, because of this 
spectators may have the impression of watching  a movement performed at almost miraculous 
speed.  
To better understand how those two principles allow time saving, we can remember Schmidt’s 
famous model (Schmidt & Lee, 2005, p.52) that simplifies the different stages of motor responses. 
According to their model for open loop movements, such as, for example, a split or a hand 
movement to the left or to the right, such motor behaviour implies action programming preceded 
by action selection induced by perception, which is, of course, the first fact. In such a 
simplification, the principle of anticipation permits time saving at the stage of response selection. 
Based either on tactical and/or technical clues observed in the situation, a player can select the 
appropriate motor response before the triggering action of the opponent has been executed or 
completed. Once the action has been selected, the principle of automaticity allows time saving by 
the programming stage, namely, when subcortical rather than cortical structures can program the 
motor act. As discussed above, this is a possibility that is proportionally linked to the degree of 
expertise of the performer. Naturally, Schmidt’s model is rather simple, and different theories 
from dynamic systems (Glazier, Davids, & Bartlett, 2003) or computational (Karniel, 2011) 
approaches would present those stages as consequences emerging from occasional self-organised 
neuronal systems rather than fixed sequential moments. Nevertheless, ongoing investigations 
regarding the neuronal organisation of motor actions during the moments preceding the visible 
output, generate strong discussions in the scientific world about a subject that may represent one 
of the most complex neurological domains. At present, there is no chance for us to enter this field 
with academic coherence, by reason of the fact that assumptions about motor control and 
learning models, even those advanced by renowned researchers, are just something more than 
speculative proposals (Glazier et al., 2003; M Fitts & I Posner, 1967; Schmidt & Lee, 2005). 
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However, we have mentioned Schmidt’s model to identify an important consideration, namely, 
that anticipation and automaticity happens at the moment when motor output is being 
developed. Furthermore, such elaboration represents a very complex neurological interaction that 
seems to prevent us from pursuing the nature of motor actions performed under time and space 
constraints.  
 
2.1.3. Visual perception in overt sports 
 
Fortunately, there is an aspect that is more accessible to research than action programming which 
precedes all decision making in overt sports. In fact, it is unlikely that anyone would ever deny that 
perceptions represent the first unavoidable moment for any motor action. Even reflex movements 
come in response to perception, somatosensory or proprioceptive in this case, but we are looking 
at action that requires decision making, those that are voluntary movements because they involve 
higher brain structures. Naturally, for this kind of action proprioception provides relevant 
information about body position that is taken into account for decision making. However, we are 
not at the moment referring to player’s internal conditions, but to external situations that the 
player is required  to solve. The most important information needed to give an appropriate answer 
in an overt sport situation is visual. Perceiving visual information is the first unavoidable step, and 
such perception must be exploitable as useful input to trigger a congruent motor output. 
In tennis, for example, relevant information is about the ball, precisely where the ball will arrive 
when hit should take place. Its localization depends on direct ball watching and tracking, but the 
decision to move towards the ball is strongly influenced by an estimation of where it will 
approximately arrive. Studies show   that for expert players in sport with moving objects the 
accuracy of this kind of estimation is higher than that of novices (Moreno, Luis, Salgado, García, & 
Reina, 2005). When experts tennis players look at the court surface where the ball is expected to 
bounce, they even focus on a smaller area whereas novices cannot be as precise and wait for the  
ball, focusing on a bigger portion of the surface (Singer et al., 1998). Furthermore, it has also been 
demonstrated (Overney, Blanke, & Herzog, 2008) that expert tennis players have better temporal 
processing, such as speed discrimination, than non-athletes or athletes of sports without moving 
objects aspects (triathletes in this study). Improvements in visual capacities for tennis players 
happen intrinsically thanks to performance. In fact, no voluntary strategy is adopted in order to 
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better anticipate or perceive the ball’s destination. Another study shows this type of spontaneous 
correct behaviour, where skilled tennis players were able to anticipate ball destination with more 
accuracy than novices (Shim et al., 2005). In this experiment, participants had to simulate a stroke 
in response to opponents hitting movements that were displayed either in 2D and 3D real sized 
videos (point-light displayed opponents were also used as test protocols but in this case did not 
find significant differences between participant groups). Nevertheless, a study investigating 
basketball professionals (S. M. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008) showed that elite players 
were able to discriminate whether a shot would score before the ball was seen to leave the 
model’s hands, suggesting that athletes predicted the basket shot’s fate by reading the body 
kinematics.  
 
2.1.4. Mirror neurons 
 
To verbally indicate the destination of a flying ball implies that the observer is aware of his 
prediction. In an experiment by Aglioti et al (2008), professional basketball players had to verbally 
guess the success of a free shot, by just observing in the video the shooter and the first portion of 
the ball’s flight. Professionals showed better prediction abilities than novices and than people 
used to watching basketball, such as, for instance, journalists and coaches. The former are even 
able to predict the result already when the ball was leaving the shooter’s hand, while less trained 
people needed to observe at least the early trajectory of the flying ball. Because of this, the 
authors argued that professionals are able to “read” the body kinematics of the opponent, a 
consideration that represents a clue to an emphatic relationship between the player and the 
observed opponent, which is possible thanks to mirror neuronal networks. In addition to this, the 
authors also recorded the participants’ MEPs (motor evoked potentials) in a second experiment 
while participants observed both free shots in basketball and free kicks in soccer. “Both visuo-
motor and visual experts showed a selective increase of MEPs during observation of basket shots. 
However, only athletes showed a time-specific motor activation during observation of erroneous 
basket throws.” By reason of the first and second experiments, they conclude that “Results 
suggest that achieving excellence in sports may be related to the fine-tuning of specific 
anticipatory 'resonance' mechanisms that endow elite athletes' brains with the ability to predict 
others' actions ahead of their realization.” As mentioned above, other authors believe that “This 
paper links the mirror system, presumed to have a key role in action understanding, with the 
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anticipatory decision making abilities shown by athletes in response to the movements of their 
opponents” (Yarrow, Brown, & Krakauer, 2009).   
Being able to determine relevant cues for decision making based on the opponent implies being 
well-skilled in the performed actions. Research has “revealed the influence of motor expertise on 
action observation” by showing that mirror neuron activation of observers were directly 
correlated to their familiarity with the observed task (B Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, 
& Haggard, 2005). In Calvo-Merino’s investigation of this, the authors first looked at the mirror 
network activations in dancers while observing unfamiliar and familiar dancing styles. The authors 
found out that observing the own (familiar) dancing style  causes stronger activation of the brain 
(B Calvo-Merino 2005). He was then even able to demonstrate (B Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2006) a stronger activation of mirror networks while observing dancers of 
the same gender performing alone rather than observing dancers of the other gender alone in 
their own dance style (which is usually coupled). However, this was only possible for those who 
where experts in the observed dance style. 
The final considerations suggest that such neuronal activations allow generating empathy with the 
observed performer. In overt sports, such empathy may suggest an opponent’s intention allowing 
us to anticipate. One study (Buccino et al., 2004) has demonstrated that only movements that are 
part of the observer’s movement repertoire cause neuronal activation in motor areas during 
observation. Besides this, not only gestures but also speed may leave spectators stunned while 
observing professionals. It seems to us impossible to reproduce such performance because they 
move in a much higher spatiotemporal dimension. This may be not due not only by an increased 
automaticity but also by visual inputs perceived much earlier than those perceivable for much less-
skilled individuals. Spectators mirror neurons cannot reproduce when witnessing what seems to 
be impossible action. This may cause such of a spectators wonder by reason of the impossibility to 
generate empathy with the observed performer, however this is mere speculation. We are falling 
dramatically again into a superstitious approach. There is no reason for this approach, because the 
speeded up capacities of Federer and of his worthy rivals are not due to clairvoyance. They are 
capacities triggered by concrete visual stimuli which are (as seen through several articles) 
scientifically increasingly explicable. Despite the fact that triggering information for decision 
making and movement are detected before the relevant object (in many cases, the ball) leaves the 
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opponent, precedents cues are concrete visual stimuli based, for instance, on opponents’ 
movement.  
 
2.1.5. Towards our experiment 
 
Summarizing the most interesting considerations for our purposes in the articles mentioned in the 
previous section, expert players benefit from two different kinds of facilitation for giving correct 
motor responses in overt sport. On one hand, they can better understand the displacement of the 
played object (the ball) for both its speed (Overney et al., 2008) and its arriving point (Singer et al., 
1998). On the other hand, they are also able to read what opponents are doing, increasing the 
possibility to predict and anticipate their actions (Shim et al., 2005) and the results of their actions 
(S. M. Aglioti et al., 2008). Investigations into this latter capacity imply the involvement of mirror 
neural networks, but we have no access to directly monitor mirror neuron activity during sports. 
Inevitably we must avoid  an experimental design that presents to participants a whole body 
representation of other people’s motion, in order to prevent the activation of their mirror system. 
In order to keep the subject more accessible, our research will only present simple visual stimuli to 
participants. Renouncing visual stimuli including opponents, which links experiments directly to 
overt sport, it is not necessarily limiting. Mirror system help performance in overt sport by 
facilitating the possibility of correct anticipation. Nevertheless anticipation is probably not the only 
quality which makes players better; it is certainly not the only increased capacity noticed in expert 
players. For instance, Overney’s study based on tennis players, shows that sport expertise is linked 
to increased capacity independent of the opponent’s motion. To be more precise, players are 
better able to discriminate the speed of moving objects while another study revealed better and 
earlier understanding of the ball trajectory (Moreno et al., 2005). 
In addition to this, it is important to emphasize that processes occur subconsciously, that is 
performers are not aware of which signals really make them select the appropriate response, 
despite the fact that they may consciously report estimations (as seen for verbally reported shots 
result predictions in M. Aglioti et al., 2008) which are based on the same kind of unconscious 
perceptions. Therefore, they are not even aware that such cues may have determined their 
decisions for congruent motor action.  
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Consequently, visual perception of simple stimuli representing the first stage of decision making 
and the utilization of this information for consequent motor behaviour, both processes, without 
necessarily involving consciousness, are now fixed as the focus of our interest. We have therefore 
chosen to prepare an experiment which could prove that humans can act in the  above mentioned 
way.  
Previously it was concluded “that humans may reach decisions based on subconscious visual 
information in a choice reaction task” (Leukel et al., 2012). Our intention is to add other 
considerations and evidence to their conclusions, a purpose that also demands an experiment 
presenting similarities but also important differences with the protocols.  
We consider that in overt sport, almost all motor actions occur in response to the visual cues. Only 
in consequence to a first visual input, anticipation and/or automaticity capacities and the 
involvement of mirror neuron networks can facilitate a congruent motor response. Specifically, 
anticipation simply means that the visual information taken into account for decision making 
happened before the situation was totally unequivocal, as, for instance, before the relevant object 
(the ball) had already been played by the opponent. Besides this, automaticity and mirror network 
activations concern the elaboration phase of the perceived visual input which remains the first 
step. Nevertheless, in our work we will prevent anticipation and emphatic elaboration of the 
situation, because we want to investigate the possibility of using unconsciously2 perceived visual 
stimuli for direct decision making. In other words, the subject of our work is visual perception and 
its utilisation for decision making in the absence of awareness.  
 
2.2. State of the art 
 
In the research of Leukel and colleagues (2012), authors first affirm that “a question that 
fascinates both psychologists and scientists interested in motor control is whether our behaviour 
can be influenced by sensory information that is not consciously perceived”. As we will see in the 
following sections, many studies have investigated the effects of subliminal primes on different 
kinds of subsequent behavioural responses. Leukel et al. (2012) lament that no previous study had 
been able to clarify whether “a subconscious cue alone is sufficient as a basis for choosing 
                                                          
2
 In this text we use the terms unconscious, unaware and subconscious interchangeably. 
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between two possible motor responses”, and their experiment was the first designed exactly to fill 
this gap at least for vision. Before discussing their study, which is the basis of our attempt to 
further investigate in their direction; we now want to look in detail at earlier research that is 
relevant to our study.  
 
In this section, we will look at the state of the art as applicable to our experiment. We first look 
through behavioural effects of unconscious perceived stimuli for senses other than vision. After 
this, we will determine how we want to use the word “unconscious” without opening new 
controversies about its definition. Last introductory considerations are about Blindsight, which is 
the first significant evidence of subconscious visual processing sustaining motor behaviour. The 
following chapters will enter and focus on the research field, as it pertains to our study.. 
 
2.2.1. Subconscious audition, touch and olfaction 
 
“Not only visual information can be processed at intensities below conscious perception” Leukel et 
al. (2012), but also other senses can be cued unconsciously. As an example of auditory subliminal 
priming, a recent paper (Sadaghiani, Hesselmann, & Kleinschmidt, 2009) that tested participants at 
their individual perception threshold and recorded fMRI. Subjects reported by button pressure 
when they believed the target stimulus had been presented (before subliminal tones were 
presented to participants as cues). In these cases, the trial was considered correct. Results 
confirmed that correct trials were preceded by “greater pre-stimulus activity in related early 
sensory cortex”. Unfortunately, we did not find any evidence there that non-conscious perceived 
tones permitted correct responses, but just that correct answers are preceded by higher cerebral 
activity in specific areas. On the other hand, the possibility for hearing, that unconscious priming 
influences target identification, has been researched by others without real success. Till now, 
nearest finding to this is from a team (Kouider & Dupoux, 2005) that used a new masking 
technique for speech priming which both time compressed and hid subliminal speech in a speech-
like background noise that resulted in “unintelligible babble” (Quinlan, Quinlan, & Dyson, 2008). In 
the latter, they admit that Kouider’s  article had provided little evidence of semantic priming for 
hearing, and that this kind of protocol will be “an outline for future, albeit limited, adventures in 
subliminal audio presentation”. Five years later the same researchers (Kouider, De Gardelle, 
Dehaene, Dupoux, & Pallier, 2010) were still only able to prove, through neuroimaging subliminal 
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priming for spoken words, essentially what they did before. In any case, evident behavioural 
effects of speech perceived at unconscious stages have not been found.  
 
For somatosensory unconscious processing, an article (Eimer, Maravita, Van Velzen, Husain, & 
Driver, 2002) investigated “the electrophysiological correlates of left-sided tactile extinction in a 
patient with right-hemisphere damage”. While the subject could not report a conscious tactile 
perception on the contralateral side (left, also in the limb for which the damaged right-hemisphere 
should permit perception), ERP (evoked related potential) showed a residual activation in the 
somatosensory cortex related to this induced left finger stimulation. This finding suggests that 
extinguished perception does not come from response absence, but from its diminution. In a 
similar experiment (Preissl et al., 2001), despite participants’ inability to consciously feel tactile 
stimulations, magneto encephalographic (MEG) recordings showed an “early (40 ms) neural 
activation in primary somatosensory cortex and absence of later (>60 ms) neural activation in the 
primary and associative areas”. This demonstrated again that the activation of those areas does 
not accordingly imply that stimulus enters awareness, but that it needs to reach an intensity 
threshold. While this latter study tested two patients waiting for brain surgery because of tumors, 
this fact should not affect the normal processing which discriminates between 
conscious/unconscious perceptions. We argue this based on a more recent and considerably larger 
(14 participants) study (Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen, Näätänen, & Palva, 2005), which also gives 
importance to the early activity in somatosensory and associate areas, which has to reach a 
degree of relevance to enter awareness. Here the first stage after stimulus onset was not related 
to ERP nor to MEG, but to neural oscillation which seemed to link conscious somatosensory 
awareness with alpha waves and conversely, very weak presence of those waves by unperceived 
trials. Nevertheless, none of the reported articles try to investigate the effects of somatosensory 
subliminal perception on behavioural actions in response to this. Instead, they just focus on the 
implicit effects measurable through brain activity machinery. While we were looking for the typical 
“masked stimulus perception and relative response” experiment paradigm, as used in several 
studies on subliminal vision, one author provided us with such a protocol to investigate touch. 
Nevertheless, Schubert and colleagues (2006; 2009) again confirm what respectively Eimer (et al., 
2002) and Palva (et al., 2005) found out through ERP and EEG, adding just some evidence that the 
early phase activity plays a crucial role for conscious perception also in a masked priming protocol. 
In both of Schubert’s experiments, participants were asked to press either a left or right pedal in 
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response to stimuli presented either on the left or right index finger, while target touch stimuli 
were preceded by weaker and masked priming. However, neither behavioural nor imagery effects 
and till now neither touch nor auditory systems,  have been able to show that subliminal perceived 
somatosensory stimuli alone are able to trigger a decision between two alternative motor 
responses.    
 
The sense of smell has also been investigated in the field of unconscious stimuli about its effects 
on humans. For instance, it is known that smell plays a role in partner selection (Herz & Inzlicht, 
2002), a mating process which we are mainly unaware of.  Olfaction also seems to determine less 
“crucial” social predilection according to a study (Li, Moallem, Paller, & Gottfried, 2007) where 
“participants rated the likeability of neutral faces after smelling pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant 
odors delivered below detection thresholds”. The influence effect of smells, on the preference of 
extraneous images of faces, decreased when the odors became more intense and also consciously 
perceivable. Likewise, other article (Walla et al., 2003) argues that while it remained unperceived, 
the smell stimulus had more power to perturb other processes, such as face recognition in this 
experiment, caused by such “multimodal sensoric interactions” between visual and olfactory 
senses. Nevertheless, we found no study that discusses the interactions between odors and motor 
control processes or decision making through different motor actions. Obviously, we suspect that 
a bad smell even if subliminally perceived could trigger an escape decision or at least a position 
change of the participants walking away from the source. However, experiments linking motor 
behaviour and olfaction, in addition to being humorous, would also likely be  very interesting as 
there are many studies about smell sense and behavioural decision in general (Hall, Johansson, 
Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen, 2010; Mitchell, Kahn, & Knasko, 2007). It is likely that many links 
could be drawn between unconscious smell perception and motor behaviour, and perhaps some 
have already been investigated. In any case, we are unaware of any published work in this area 
explicitly investigating this. We can nevertheless summarize, by stating that odors can have some 
effects on discriminative processes even when they are not consciously perceived.  
 
 
 
18 
 
2.2.2. What “unconscious” means for us 
 
We have already made a short review regarding some recent findings about subliminal perception 
for other senses than vision and their related effects on behaviour. In some manner, many stimuli 
of different kinds have some effect on neural processes even when they were not consciously 
perceived by the participants of those experiments. However, as we have seen in the previous 
section, it is possible to conclude that also for other senses it has not been possible to 
demonstrate that unconscious perceived information alone triggers a related motor response. This 
lack generates a debate about how decision making can be influenced from subliminal stimuli and 
even if this is possible (Leukel et al., 2012). In addition, the unconscious mind is a controversial 
field of research, where many discussions turn around main and basic points such as its definition, 
and the power and consequences of processes in response to stimuli which do not enter our 
awareness. John A. Bargh is a famous social psychologist who has made a significant contribution 
to the nature and implication of the these debates (J.A Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; John A. Bargh, 
1992). Our present necessity is to collocate our work in his research, while also considering the 
ongoing controversy and Bargh’s four year old review of “the unconscious mind” (John A Bargh & 
Morsella, 2008) provides us with a good starting reference and a broad perspective. He identifies a 
first problem in the definition of unconscious, a word which has not been interpreted with the 
same meaning since the beginning. Originally, evolutionary biologists such as Darwin, but also a 
neurologist such as Freud, used the word unconscious “much more in terms of unintentional 
actions rather than unawareness of stimuli”. This meaning survived till the end of the last century 
where “this equation of unconscious with unintentional is how unconscious phenomena have been 
conceptualized and studied within social psychology”. Nevertheless, at the same time the doubt 
that behaviour was not only and always consciously guided, pushed researchers to challenge this 
overall assumption. Social psychology also started to investigate the effects of priming on 
behaviour and Bargh determined here that the main point in research into the unconscious 
became “unconscious influences in terms of a lack of awareness of the influences or effects of a 
triggering stimulus”. This is true obviously just for one of the two traditions in unconscious 
research that are largely independent from each other, namely: “the New Look research in 
perception involving the preconscious analysis of stimuli prior to the products of the analysis being 
furnished to conscious awareness, and skill-acquisition research involving the gain in efficiency of 
processes with practice over time until they become subconscious (see the review in Bargh and 
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Chatrand, 2000)” (John A Bargh & Morsella, 2008). This latter field of research is rather more 
linked to motor control science than the former, to which this work however belongs. To avoid 
misunderstanding, we also specify here that in our work we will be using Bargh’s “operational 
definition” of unconscious, namely: “as a system that handles subliminal-strength stimulation from 
the environment”.  
 
2.2.3. Blindsight  
 
We have already clarified our meaning of unconscious after reviewing the state of the art of this 
particular perception condition for other senses than vision. Now, we are interested in the effects 
of unconscious vision on motor behaviour. Existence of this kind of interaction was evident to us 
long before any investigation through research working with typical subliminal priming and related 
response protocol. In the so called “Blindsight behaviour” patients show reactions in response to 
unconscious visual information”  
 
Specifically, the general definition of Blindsight “is the ability of patients with absolute, clinically 
established, visual field defects caused by occipital cortical damage to detect, localize, and 
discriminate visual stimuli despite being phenomenally visually unaware of them” (Cowey, 2010). 
In contrast, in this recent and quite broad look,the “Blindsight saga” author discusses his own 
definition based on some effects which should challenge the principle of unaware perception for 
this kind of visually impaired patients. Many doubts are considered that even constrain him to ask 
whether the “unconscious nature of Blindsight is trivial”. This is based on at least two main facts 
already observed in patients with field or complete blindness. First, he set as “clear” evidence that 
“subjects who report no visual percepts commonly retain reflexive responses to light, which might, 
in theory, underlie their correct forced-choice performance”. Second, he looked at the residual 
visual discrimination capacities observed instead by Weiskrantz (Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, 
& Marshall, 1974) who found, among other things, “target localization and shape discrimination in 
the famous patient DB, whose surgical removal of right V14”. We may conclude that light reflexes 
and residual discrimination constitute two important points for the ongoing debate about the 
effective unconscious perception condition for Blindsight patients. Further, while the above 
                                                          
4
 The subject still had healthy eyes but neural signals from the eyes could no longer be processed in V1. Therefore, the 
processing of this information must have taken place elsewhere in the brain.  
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definition does not directly imply that such features can be used for motor actions, several 
experiments have proved this possibility as it will be mention below. Furthermore, obstacle 
avoidance, as we have already seen above, is already an evidence of movement performed in 
response to visual information about which the person was not aware. There obstacles were not 
identifiable as stimuli that changed the light contrast and that developed reflex effects, and still, 
participants did not verbally report any kind of awareness of them (Gelder, de, Haan, & De 
Heywood, 2001). Further still, this adaptation to obstacles had been observed for quite different 
tasks as, for example, when McIntosh required participants to perform a hand reaching movement 
(McIntosh, McClements, Dijkerman, Birchall, & Milner, 2004). Here “patients with left visual 
neglect had to bisect the gap between two cylinders or to reach rapidly between them to a more 
distal target zone” and reported that “in the bisection task, all neglect patients showed 
qualitatively the same asymmetry, with the left cylinder exerting less influence than the right. In 
the reaching task, the neglect group behaved like normal subjects, being influenced approximately 
equally by the two cylinders.” 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: a lower score in mm indicates less influence from the related cylinder (dPl -> left cylinder dPr -> right 
cylinder); normal subjects are influenced equally by the left and right cylinders. Therefore left visual neglect 
affected a patient’s performance stronger for perceptual bisection tasks than for the motor reaching task (R 
D McIntosh et al., 2004). 
 
Of course we cannot speak, in this case, about totally unconscious controlled movement because 
participants were nevertheless aware of the presence of the left cylinder perceived on the 
peripheral left side of the intact right visual field. In any case, this experiment represents for us a 
case where motor tasks indicate a different behaviour process than the perceptual one which 
should imply a different neural process as well. An experiment (Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & 
Carey, 1991) based on just one patient, represents another case in this sense. A woman who had a 
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“profound disorder” in the recognition of “shape, orientation and size” of a three dimensional 
object, could nevertheless “demonstrate “strikingly accurate guidance of hand and finger 
movements directed at the very objects whose qualities she fails to perceive.” To explain such 
facts, the authors of the above bisection task experiment, mention the famous contribution of 
Milnar and Goodale (A. David Milner & Goodale, 1995) as well, arguing that there “may be 
separate neural modulation processes for “visuomotor attention” and “perceptual attention” 
operating in the dorsal and ventral streams respectively, with the dorsal attentional system in 
control overall”. A broader discussion about this operational separation will follow in section 2.2.6.   
Blindsight, patients’ perceptual processing does not work while processing for correct motor 
behaviour does. This is therefore, in some ways, another reason to suspect that subliminal priming 
may also be processed by other brain regions other than occipital areas. However, for such 
purposes, instead of walking through obstacles we should test the Blindsight effect while 
performing the same tasks as in our experiment. In spite of the fact that the above considerations 
about Blindsight were all based on patients, the blindness condition does not always come from 
pathologies or lesions (Christensen et al., 2008). Christensen et al (2008) induced blindness in 
healthy subjects “by using transcranial magnetic stimulation over the visual cortex”. Because of 
this artificial suppression, participants were also “truly blind” and neither partial sight nor light 
changes or movements or flickering could be reported, as instead do patients with visual 
impairment, where, because of such perceptions, their true “blindness” is a controversial point of 
discussion. The method used for this experiment is interesting for us because of the same 
purpose: it was designed to gather, in a number of trials, a left/right reaching response to 
unconsciously perceived visual stimuli. However, this unawareness condition was here 
(Christensen et al., 2008) obtained by timed suppression of V1 and not by displaying very fast 
stimuli as in our experimental design. In their study, “the subjects were required to reach toward 
one of three buttons indicated by a light. In 40% of the trials, a second light was turned on either 
to the left or the right, and the subjects then tried to correct the movement in response to this 
light. To induce virtual blindness, a single pulse of TMS was applied in half of the trials over the 
visual cortex 80–90 ms after the second light was turned on”. In each trial, subjects had both to 
correct the movement to the second light and to report verbally if they perceived the stimulus.  
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Fig. 4: TMS strongly reduced awareness perception of the visual stimuli in all participants except 
subject 11 (Christensen et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: successful corrections of the reaching action were performed in response to an unperceived 
second light stimulus (with a 2nd light), otherwise corrections without a 2nd light represent 
erroneous responses (Christensen et al., 2008). 
 
 
On one hand, results demonstrate that TMS can strongly reduce correct stimuli identification (fig. 
4). On the other hand, because fig. 5 only shows trials with TMS, corrections were nevertheless 
possible despite a loss of awareness reporting of the stimulus. Briefly, the authors have arguments 
to support that they have provoked Blindsight-like behaviour in healthy subjects, based on the fact 
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that participants “could perform corrective reaching movements without being aware of the 
presence of the visual signal that guides behavior.” Christensen et al. (2008), however, did not try 
to advance many explanations regarding neural systems which allow such behaviour. They merely 
suppose that “the mechanism responsible for fast visually guided corrective movements lies 
outside visual cortex” and that “the visual signals used for correction of movements bypass visual 
cortex. There may be subcortical routes for visually guided reaching that bypass the cortical 
regions affected by TMS”. Some help seems to come from at least two experiments which deal 
with the “crucial role of the collicular-extrastriate pathway in non conscious visuomotor 
integration by showing that, in the absence of V1, the superior colliculus is essential to translate 
visual signals that cannot be consciously perceived into motor outputs” (Tamietto et al., 2010). In 
addition, Schmid’s  et al., (2010) results “demonstrate that direct LGN (lateral geniculate nucleus) 
projections to the extrastriate cortex have a critical functional contribution to Blindsight. They 
suggest a viable pathway to mediate fast detection during normal vision.” This last consideration 
interests us particularly because of the very short duration of the stimuli in our experiment. 
However, Blindsight and our experiment conditions are not the same. Blindsight is a visual lack 
because of a complete or partial lesion or inhibition of the striate cortex, while in our experiment, 
this brain region in participants presents no kind of perturbation and can operate normally.  
 
Two further suggestions come now from Blindsight, in addition to the intrinsic inspiration to our 
experiment: the existence of extra striate visual pathways working in some manner together with 
motor cortex and the existence of an ongoing debate about the role played by V1 for visual 
awareness. This latter interaction has been, in fact, often discussed together with Blindsight 
behaviour (Lamme, Supèr, Landman, Roelfsema, & Spekreijse, 2000; Stoerig, 2006; Leopold, 2012). 
 
In the previous four paragraphs, we have briefly overviewed studies in the field that is similar to 
our own, namely, the field we would like to call “responses related to visual subliminal priming” , a 
name that emphasizes the typically used experimental protocol. Before having clarified what 
“unconscious” means in our case, we quickly found that unconscious perceptions by other senses 
than vision have already been investigated. Till now, vision however seems to be the sense that is 
most influenced by information perceived without consciousness. This is demonstrated by 
Blindsight (see “introduction” above), while being one of the most unusual effects in motor 
behaviour, is nevertheless that has been explained scientifically. These examples may have 
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influenced us towards accepting our research assumptions even before any precise investigation 
oriented to our goal, namely that motor responses could bypass conscious perception of the 
triggering stimuli. In the next section, we will enter our research field and review some significant 
contributions which will bring us to the point of Leukel’s most recent considerations.  
 
2.2.4. Motor response setting before the end of perceptual processes 
 
Before investigating how subliminal perceived stimuli could trigger a motor response, we need to 
be sure that the perceptual processing and the response process are not necessarily sequential. 
This would be the case if we accept that becoming aware of a stimulus is part of the perceptual 
process, when the stimulus has the power to trigger an evident motor action in response to it. We 
also have to exclude the possibility that motor action in response to a stimulus starts only once 
there is awareness of the relevant stimulus. Otherwise, it would be, in any case, impossible that a 
subconscious visual stimulus could influence a motor response to this.  
In a ten-year old paper (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003), the author distinguished between two kinds 
of models that could represent perceptual-motor interactions. The older one is the traditional 
representation, where "discrete stages" of these interactions should follow one another in a 
"strictly successive order". This has been replaced by models which respect the principle of “flow 
of information” between sensory and motor systems. For this more recent representation, Eimer e 
Schlaghecken cited some articles where the response process is influenced by sensory information 
before the analysis of their stimuli has been completed (responses occurred after stimuli 
apparition). Two of those studies (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Smid, 
Mulder, & Mulder, 1990) used “the muscle activity through electromyogram as indicator of 
peripheral activity onset” and “the latency of the P3 component of the event related brain 
potential (ERP) as an index of stimulus evaluation duration”. Smid et al. (1990) added “the onset of 
lateralized motor activity derived from the ERP as an index of selective central motor activation”. 
However, this last method merely confirms what the two studies were able to demonstrate, 
namely that before stimulus analysis is completed the perceived information already has some 
effects on the response process.  
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It is not important for our purposes whether or not Eimer distinguishes between “continuous” for 
the first mentioned study and “asynchronous” for the second model of perceptual-motor 
interaction (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). The important point for us is that stimulus perception 
processes and the set of response processes are not necessarily subsequent stages of processing 
and that the first can also be completed when the latter already has started.  
 
2.2.5. Unconscious stimuli can initiate response processes 
 
What we have affirmed in the previous section about the interposition of perceptual and response 
phases does not consequently mean that a stimulus can trigger a correct motor response before 
awareness. Other studies cited in Eimer’s & Schlaghecken’s (2003) paper, however, claim to have 
demonstrated this, where Elmer states that “even stimuli presented near or below the threshold 
of conscious awareness can trigger response activation processes” (as we have seen in the 
previous section). We would like now to briefly investigate other articles which appear to confirm 
the possibility for a subconscious stimulus to start a motor response.  
Neumann & Klotz's experiment (1994) presented to the participants a “two-choice situation” (a 
condition that has a strong similarity to our experiment), where, depending on the position of the 
stimulus (this is an important difference compared to our experiment as we will explain in section 
2.2.7.), information follows a prime which has been made subliminal by a metacontrast 5 effect. 
This implies that prime and target are not projected to a fixation point, but are displaced either to 
adjacent positions for congruent and, at quite separated locations, for incongruent trials. This 
experimental condition, as we will discuss, constitutes an improvement possibility for our 
experiment and the experiments that inspired us. When stimuli are presented at fixation, the 
participants can solely perceive the meaning of the cues (in our case, their direction demanding 
either left or right choice) without being helped by their localization on the spot. Furthermore, 
also compared to our experiment the method used for masking the prime is here in many ways 
different, because we exploit the absolute display duration and a low color contrast between the 
prime and its background, but not the metacontrast as in this case. In any case, they also obtained 
                                                          
5 The relevant information that appears in a zone of the visual field adjacent to the prime’s position. 
Because of the short delay, the subjective brightness of the prime dramatically decreases till it becomes 
consciously unperceived, as happened in the cited article.  
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an unconscious perception of the masked prime which has an influence on the motor response to 
the stimulus. Another interesting point in their results is the amount of errors for the incongruent 
primes which are 5 times higher than for the other two conditions. 
 
Fig. 6: Compared to neutral trials, reaction times are shorter when target and prime are 
compatible and longer when they are incompatible (Neumann & Klotz, 1994). 
The authors take the frequent errors induced by incongruent primes as “strong evidence that the 
masked prime triggered the response in a considerable number of trials” which also implies “that 
a stimulus can have access to the motor system and activate or even start an intended, planned 
response without being represented in consciousness”.  
In the successive experiment,  Eimer & Schlaghecken (1998)  challenge the benefit (discussed 
above, see fig. 6) of congruent primes on reaction time and error rates. They suspected that “cost-
benefit” pattern reported by them (Neumann & Klotz, 1994) may at least partially be attributable 
to sensory priming because primes and targets were presented at identical locations in compatible 
trials but at contralateral sides in incompatible trials”. To investigate only motor behavioural 
response effects, they also decided to present primes and targets (either left or right response 
demanding) at fixation. Furthermore, they recorded lateralized readiness potential (LRP) which 
indicates the left-right activation degree of motor cortex areas responsible for hand movements. A 
16 ms prime (left-right pointing arrow or LL RR letters in one control trial block) appears on display 
and is followed by 100 ms neutral masking. Neutral masking is made by a double arrow pointing 
inside or outside before the target follows the prime with the same or opposite pointing direction. 
Targets appear for 100 ms. Contrary to what the authors expected based on the inspiring article by 
(Neumann & Klotz, 1994) and the logical hypothesis, results showed an inverse influence between 
primes and targets.  
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Fig. 7: compatibility between cues and target caused higher error rate than incompatible trials 
(Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998) 
We do not consider the protocols where letters were used as targets because they were just used 
as control trials. They were presented in order to be sure that responses are not triggered 
automatically from any kind of stimulus, for instance from stimuli that are not assigned to a 
precise response. Incompatible trials need shorter reaction times and trigger fewer errors while 
compatible primes cause the highest error rate and need the longest reaction times on average. 
LRP confirms the tendencies about delay time at motor cortex level, and provide further 
interesting information about the response process.  
 
Fig. 8: Lateralized Readiness Potential recording. Compatible trials initially show a correct motor 
response activation followed by an inversion which delays the response and also causes errors in 
many cases. The same principle, only reversed, is evident for the incompatible trials while no such 
pre-response activation pattern is present for neutral trials (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
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The authors challenge their own results with two other similar experiments. The second protocol 
is presumed to prevent the aforementioned response inversion’s dependence on the “sequential 
presentation of prime and mask”. In the original protocol, the double-arrow masks could be 
perceived as a single arrow added to the opposite side of the prime’s, causing a moving effect 
which is suspected to inverse the first response activation which is coherent with the prime 
direction. In the second experiment, double arrows pointing either outside or inside (< > , > <) are 
used as symmetrical primes and targets, requiring respectively a left or a right hand movement. 
Neutral trials were also excluded. Nevertheless, compared with first protocol used, results do not 
change, but rather reflect the same tendencies.  
 
 
Fig. 9: analogue results as in the first protocol (fig. 8 and 9), where asymmetrical targets were 
presented, also with symmetrical targets (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
Behavioural responses are already facilitated by incompatible trials and affected by a compatible 
relationship between prime and target. Furthermore, the LRP wave demonstrates that the 
activation, in response to the prime, reverses about 100 ms later in an opposite response, before 
finally corresponding to the target. The authors also investigate the second and last possible 
reason suspected to be responsible for this effect, namely that in the presence of a two-hand 
choice task both are activated successively , causing the RT costs while stopping the reaching 
action of the other hand. To exclude this factor, a third experiment uses both a single-hand and a 
single-finger movement task.   
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Fig. 10: a third protocol involving a single-hand and a single-finger movement task, confirming 
what was observed in the two previous protocols, namely, shorter reaction delay and lower error 
rates for incompatible trials. LRP was not recorded, (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
The authors finally considered the presence of an inhibitory process to explain these results. 
Correct response activation after prime is suspected to be inhibited by the masking which causes 
such a suppression of the perceived original information. This could explain both RT costs and 
performance deterioration for compatible trials and benefits for incompatible trials.  
This study shows that subliminal primes can influence the reaction times when reacting on 
subsequent target stimuli. It depends, however, on different factors whether a congruent trial 
facilitates or inhibits the reaction time. What is important for our purposes, as the authors in fact 
stressed, is the fact that “the results of our experiments have again demonstrated that stimuli that 
are not consciously perceived nevertheless can have a strong influence on motor activation and 
behavioral performance.” (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
In addition, the authors argue that this inhibition effect would provide further evidence of the 
“direct visuomotor control system of the dorsal processing stream” as theorized by the famous 
book by Milner and Goodale (A. David Milner & Goodale, 1995). A detailed discussion of their 
work will follow in the next section.  
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2.2.6. Visual system  
 
The last section ended mentioning the fundamental contribution of David Milner and Melvyn 
Goodale (A. David Milner & Goodale, 1995), which is a great point of reference for all successive 
studies into the structures and functioning of visual systems. Their book “The Visual Brain in 
Action”, published for the first time in 1995, contains their most important considerations and 
those of others regarding the separation between dorsal and ventral visual systems. The latest 
edition of their book, published seven years ago (A. David Milner & Goodale, 2006), still promotes 
this distinction. Their main and central topic is the existence of two separate systems for vision: 
“In summary we are suggesting that two separate networks of areas have evolved in the primate 
visual cortex: a perceptual system which is indirectly linked to action via cognitive processes, and a 
visuomotor system which is intimately linked with motor control.” Such a dichotomy, “Perhaps the 
best functional distinction in visual neuroscience” (p. 21), had first been advanced in 1968 by 
Trevarthen. His work is quite commendable, considering that brain functioning was investigated 
without the use of today’s modern machinery. Just by reason of “The survey of anatomical and 
physiological features of the primate brain, and the result of behavioural experiments following 
surgery to parts of the visuo-motor mechanism” he concluded “that two kinds of visual function 
may be distinguished in the regulation of primate behaviour. One is ambient or extensive, the 
other is focal or intensive”. This implies different structures, respectively the dorsal and the 
ventral pathways, where the former is responsible for whole body actions such as locomotion and 
posture and the latter for guiding fine motor acts such as manipulation (A. David Milner & 
Goodale, 2006, p. 21).  
A very common simplified definition calls the occipito-temporal (ventral) stream the "what" 
pathway, whereas the occipito-parietal (dorsal) stream implied in the mediation of spatial 
perception and visually guided actions is named “where” and/or “how” pathway (Creem & 
Proffitt, 2001). In a review, which provides many considerations about dorsal and ventral 
processes, Norman (Norman, 2002) summarizes well the main features of the two systems. 
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Fig. 11: the main differences differentiating the two distinct visual processing streams in the 
original model (Norman, 2002)6 
After checking this table, it seems easy to attribute to the dorsal system the effects described by 
Eimer (in Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998), reported in the previous section, where a “visually guided 
behaviour” task, requiring high speed processing with no consciousness of the primes, was being 
described. Nevertheless, this is merely a theoretical model, whereas neuronal reality is of course 
much more complicated and still under investigation. For instance, already ten years ago, Rizzolati 
(Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003) presented “a detailed description of the multiple neural circuits 
connecting the frontal, temporal, and parietal cortices” (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2012). While this 
consideration was originally based on a study of macaque, the previously mentioned review of 
Binkofski (2012) confirms that this is also true for humans. His recent contribution argues that the 
“dorsal system is further divided respectively in the dorsal-dorsal and in the ventro-dorsal 
processing streams.” Whereas “the former also called “Grasp” system, processes structural 
characteristics of particular exemplars of currently-viewed objects (e.g., shape, size, and 
orientation) for the purposes of prehensile actions" the latter or “ventro-dorsal stream, named 
“Use” system, is concerned with long-term storage of the particular skilled actions associated with 
familiar objects." However, this further distinction summarized by Binkofsky still remains near to 
the Milner and Goodale (1996) perspective, while adding some improvements. Nevertheless, 
other contributions challenge or even deny their renowned model. A quite recent review entitled 
“Two visual systems for perception and action: current trends” (McIntosh & Schenk, 2009) present 
a useful instrument for looking through all main discussions about this model. For example, the 
                                                          
6 (5 mars 2013) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-streams_hypothesis 
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authors first mentioned a consideration based on a single patient with agnosia who showed 
“impaired planning contrasting with preserved action programming” (R D McIntosh et al., 2004). 
Because of this observed fact, Milner and Goodale (2008) see "planning-programming distinction 
as a critical boundary between ventral and dorsal stream influences on behaviour" and further 
contributions about it are waited for the future. Another disease which calls into question the 
separation between two visual systems is optic ataxia that follows a dorsal stream lesion 
presenting misreaching problems like attentional simultanagnosia, “which often accompanies 
optic ataxia following bilateral parietal lesions”. The similarity of the two mentioned diseases 
“raises the important question of the functional relationship between attentional and visuomotor 
impairments following dorsal stream lesions”. Another distinction under investigation is the 
delayed actions that should always be supported by the ventral stream because, according to the 
binary model, the dorsal stream “shouldn’t be able to store visual representations across temporal 
gaps” (Robert D McIntosh & Schenk, 2009). They also mention experiments that used prism 
adaptation to check whether difficult transfer between immediate and delayed actions could 
demonstrate different processing streams. Controversially, while the older research (Baraduc & 
Wolpert, 2002; Scheidt & Ghez, 2007) argued, in fact, for an overlapping between visuomotor 
systems, more recent studies have reported perfect transfer for immediate and delayed pointing 
(Rogers, Smith, & Schenk, 2009). The most controversial ongoing debate about the validity of the 
dorsal and ventral model turns around visual illusions. Following the concept of dissociation 
between an allocentric (ventral) and egocentric (dorsal) system, manipulations of a visual context 
which are able to produce fake perceptions of objects’ size, location or orientation, should not 
affect the latter mentioned system nor motor behaviour with respect to an object. An article with 
an appropriate title, “Size-contrast illusion deceives the eye but not the hand” (S. Aglioti, DeSouza, 
& Goodale, 1995) provides evidence in this sense. Subsequent criticism about dissociate affection 
of visual illusions came primarily from a German research team (V H Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, 
& Fahle, 2000) that showed “no difference in the sizes of the perceptual and grasp illusions if the 
perceptual and grasping tasks are appropriately matched”. Eight years later, Franz and 
Gegenfurtner (Volker & Gegenfurtner, 2008) published an article entitled “Grasping visual 
illusions: consistent data and no dissociation”. Unfortunately, not all studies used the same type of 
illusion, and this fact alone causes controversy where same illusion also produces different results 
(Bruno, Bernardis, & Gentilucci, 2008). For instance, Müller-Lyer’s illusion affects both perception 
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as well as grasping, but when hand reaching enters the visual field, online correction occurs and 
allows for normal reaching despite disturbed perception (Bruno et al., 2008). 
However, after mentioning the key points that have generated debate about the two visual 
system model, our reference review (Robert D McIntosh & Schenk, 2009), speaks in favour of this 
model, but denies a clear independence between the two systems. In fact, they prefer to identify a 
dynamic collaboration of “the many visual brain areas that arrange themselves from task to task 
into novel functional networks”. 
Recently, it was argued that “it has to be mentioned that it is still under debate whether or not 
there exist two different streams for processing different aspects of visual perception (Leukel et 
al., 2012). Therefore, conclusions about the neural processing of unconscious information in the 
present study cannot be drawn”. This is a consideration that can also be used for our experiment. 
Naturally,  we are not able to add personal considerations about this renowned visual model. 
Nevertheless, Eimers’ considerations from the previous section, forced us to further investigate his 
attempt to rather quickly attribute his results to the existence of a dorsal processing stream. 
Moreover, for work centred on visual processing, it is unavoidable to focus, at least briefly, on 
Milner and Goodale’s fundamental assumption.   
We have in section 2.1.5. considered the admission of the impossibility of defining a precise model 
of the visual system which permits correct motor behaviour. Of course, the main functioning of 
single organs and the main pathways of the visual system are today generally well known. 
Photoreceptors in the retina transform light changes into action potentials which are transmitted 
and mediated through other important structures (such as the lateral geniculate nucleus, the 
pulvinar nuclei and the superior colliculus) before reaching V1 (primary visual cortex) and 
associated visual cortex areas. Nevertheless, as seen in the light of the debate mentioned in last 
paragraph, it is still unclear how visual inputs are projected from occipital areas to others. 
Moreover, there are “a multiplicity of parallel pathways that bypass V1 and project to other 
targets in the brain whose contribution to vision is multifold and not yet ultimately established” 
(Tamietto et al., 2010). For example, these authors demonstrate the “crucial role of the collicular-
extrastriate pathway in nonconscious visuomotor integration by showing that, in the absence of 
V1, the superior colliculus (SC) is essential to translate visual signals that cannot be consciously 
perceived into motor outputs”. Such an observation was made with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging while a “gray stimulus presented in the blind field of a patient with unilateral 
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V1 loss, although not consciously seen, could influence his behavioral and pupillary responses to 
consciously perceived stimuli in the intact field”.  
Recently, new brain imagery techniques, such as diffusion tensor imaging, were used to 
investigate alternative visual pathways leading from pre-striate structures. For instance a study 
(Leh, Chakravarty, & Ptito, 2008) showed how “pulvinar nuclei are interconnected with subcortical 
structures (superior colliculus, thalamus, and caudate nucleus) as well as with cortical regions 
(primary and secondary visual areas, visual inferotemporal areas, posterior parietal association 
areas, frontal eye fields and prefrontal areas”. Another investigation with MRI (diffusion magnetic 
resonance imagery) technique showed on a single patient “two major features absent in controls: 
a contralateral pathway from right LGN to left MT+/V5; a substantial cortico-cortical connection 
between MT+/V5 bilaterally”. A case that suggests how “employing alternative brain regions for 
processing of information following cortical damage in childhood may strengthen or establish 
specific connections” (Bridge, Thomas, Jbabdi, & Cowey, 2008).  
The three articles above represent just a small example among several studies that have 
attempted to understand alternative neural pathways involved in the visual system. Despite the 
fact that two of them were based on medical patients and do not represent normal functioning, it 
is necessary to consider some important points. First, we have seen an example of a structure that 
provided motor output bypassing V1, which also happened through a stream that leaves the 
relevant stimulus consciously unperceived. This is significant for our purposes, because it permits 
the study of other similar possibilities in normal subjects, namely that extra striate pathways that 
process visual information can enable correct motor behaviour in response to subliminal stimuli. 
Secondly, the last article (Bridge et al., 2008) suggests that because of neural plasticity, new 
connections for visual perception could be established to repair lesions. This latter, represent a 
first example to our knowledge of neural plasticity related to visual processing. We suggest that, 
the strengthening or even the establishment of alternative connections could perhaps occur to 
facilitate specific tasks even when lesions are absent. More precisely, it follows that similar 
adaptation in visual neural circuits may also occur after regular practice doing tasks that demand 
specific processing, as may occur in overt sports. In Leukel’s experiment, a skilled table tennis 
player was able to consciously give correct responses even at the shortest stimuli duration (20 ms) 
while all other participants had a higher conscious detection threshold. This case shows that 
better capacities for visual processing could be either congenital or reinforced through sport 
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practice. On the one hand, no study has tested individual improvement in such experimental quick 
visual detection due to ball sport practice. On the other hand, more than one article mentioned in 
sections 2.1.2., 2.1.3 demonstrated that in experimental conditions as well, better visual capacities 
were found for tennis players compared to the control group. It would be interesting to research, 
through neuroimaging, at which stage and how the visual perception of players differs from 
normal people. We would like to verify whether players use other visual pathways specifically 
developed for similar tasks or whether the same circuits that normal people have, are used only 
faster. In any case, it is important to point out that in order to deal with the presence of lesions or 
to solve specific demands, alternative pathways for visual processing may be used, old ones may 
be strengthened and even new ones established, thanks to brain plasticity. Further, as mentioned 
above, we have already seen one of those streams transforming unconsciously reported stimulus 
into motor output.   
 
2.2.7. Subliminal cues alone permit correct motor reaction.  
 
In the previous section, we looked at the state of the art regarding neuronal organisation of the 
visual system. Before this, we saw how subliminal cues could influence a successive target which 
triggered a related response. There we saw a case where unconscious congruent stimuli reduced 
reaction time and another case where reaction times were instead affected differently by 
compatible or incompatible cues. Other recent studies and reviews (Boy, Clarke, & Sumner, 2008; 
Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009) reported similar experiments using a 
masked-cue paradigm to investigate the effects on successive targets. Further studies have added 
to the knowledge of unconscious motor behaviour, for example regarding the role played by 
attention (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007) or about unconscious conflict adaptation (Desender, Van 
Lierde, & Van den Bussche, 2013). However, according to Leukel (et al., 2012), an open crucial 
question seems to be unanswered since the beginning of such studies. Specifically, he argues that 
no one has been able to clarify whether an “unconscious stimulus alone is sufficient as a basis for 
choosing between two possible motor responses.”  To emphasize this point, Leukel refers to a 
relatively old article (Taylor & McCloskey, 1996) that attempted to solve this question. Despite the 
fact that the authors concluded “that subconscious information may not only be used for initiating 
motor responses in simple tasks”, Leukel clearly disputes this by stating that “the experiment 
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could not clarify whether the subconscious cue indeed initiated the response or whether it only 
facilitated the reaction (in terms of a faster reaction time) that is actually initiated in response to 
the strong stimulus (mask). This is because the mask was always exclusively presented on the 
same side as the subconscious cue, not on both sides (i.e. it was not a ‘‘neutral’’ mask). Both 
stimuli, the subconscious (first) and conscious (second) one, therefore had the same meaning.” 
Nevertheless, Leukel seems here to overlook that in Taylor’s protocols, the mask did not always 
follow the “test” light. In the picture below, it is reported how the test light was displayed alone in 
some trials.  
 
 
 
Fig. 12: a mask also followed in protocol “test light alone” trials, but this occurred with a delay time 
(500 ms) that was longer than the reaction time to the test light that was being tested by those 
trials (Taylor & McCloskey, 1996). 
 
In those trials without masking stimuli, participants reacted as quick and correctly as in the trials 
followed by masking. Because of this fact, the authors expect to have demonstrated correct motor 
response while choosing between two different possibilities. More precisely, they summarized 
their finding as follows: “appropriate programs for two separate movements can be 
simultaneously held ready for use, and that either one can be executed when triggered by specific 
stimuli without subjective awareness of such stimuli and so without further voluntary elaboration 
in response to such awareness.” After having carefully investigated Taylor and McCloskey’s 
contribution we still cannot decide if their experimental condition was really able to demonstrate 
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their conclusion. This conclusion would be of course strongly relevant for us, but one important 
detail, however, leads us rather to Leukel’s experimental design. In Taylor’s experimental protocol, 
participants’ choices depend on the location of the target cue and not on its features, because 
they have to respond to flashing circles either on the left or right side of the visual field. This 
causes us to think that while doing sport, humans can make decisions dependent on the location 
of perceived stimuli without awareness. In any case, we are more interested in the idea that 
humans are able to use relevant information for motor behaviour that also depend on the nature 
of the fixed location and not just from its location. Vicker’s great contribution (Vickers, 2007) to 
the understanding  of human gazing behaviour while performing sport, revealed that, compared to 
novices, expert players have a different gazing behaviour with regards to the action. They fixate on 
fewer locations, but gazes stay longer on each fixation point while saccade switches are faster. 
Because of quicker and more appropriate tactical responses (Martell & Vickers, 2004), experts 
unconsciously guide and focus their gaze to the locations where relevant information will appear 
(due to the sudden changes in conditions in overt sports, such information usually appears just for 
short times). Of course in overt tasks, relevant information could also appear at unattended 
locations, and the capacity to find this information in a given situation is the first step for 
appropriate tactical behaviour. The ability to switch gaze trough saccades among targets that are 
only briefly perceivable seems to be linked with what was demonstrated by Taylor & McCloseky 
(1996). There, participants were able to use a 5 ms unconscious stimulus, appearing at different 
locations, for correct motor responses. Here, the location of the stimuli alone was the determining 
factor for correct choice, but in other cases, once the gaze is on the right fixation point, further 
features of the fixed point could be determinant to make the right decision. Going back to the 
example of tennis from our introduction, relevant details could be, for instance, the angle of the 
opponent’s racquet or foot position or many other types of information. Hypothetically, all kinds 
of tecnical or tactical information, based either on opponents or on the situation, entering a 
player’s visual field, could be suspected as being relevant for correct visuomotor behaviour. As 
said in the introduction, information based on the opponent may involve a mirror system which 
allows player’s to anticipate the opponent’s action and consequently the motor response. 
Nevertheless, enternig the sphere of the human mirror system is beyond the scope of this present 
study, as well as any discussion of motorbehaviour in response to an opponent’s whole body 
motion. In fact, we are now only considering that after the player focalizes on a relevant location 
in his visual field,  once his gaze fixes on it, another ability is needed, namely that his brain’s 
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visuomotor system, can detect and use the fixed information for correct motor responses. Besides 
this, we are intrested in the degree of awareness while performing such motor responses. High 
time constraints in overt sports, imply that response capacity does not necessarly require 
conscious processing in players that unconsciously use the cues to choose and trigger the 
appropiate movement. Studies (Panchuk & Vickers, 2006; Savelsbergh, Williams, Van der Kamp, & 
Ward, 2002) demonstrate that for expert goaltenders, different gaze searches than novices are 
among the shooter-based cues. Of course, the former have more succesful motor responses than 
the latter, showing that focalizing on appropiate cues could be determinant. Naturally, such 
appropiate gazes in search of relevant cues, happen without volountary gaze control on the part 
of the player (goaltenders in the previously mentioned examples,  develop such capacities with 
expertise, and  thanks to practicing). Despite the fact that gaze orientation happens without 
awareness, it does not consequently prove that fixation information unconsciously triggers 
appropiate motor responses. In some way, the ability to use unconsciuosly perceived stimuli  for 
correct motor behaviour, was still based on  “unproved evidence” till the study by Leukel just one 
year ago. We wish to call this “unproved evidence” because if gaze searches enable the finding of 
relevant cues, logically, cues also need to be unconsciously identified depending on their nature 
(orientation, movement, direction and so on). Despite legitimate suspicions, no scientific research 
had been able to demonstrate this capacity. Leukel finally prepared a protocol which investigated 
whether participants are able to use unconscious targets that are always displayed at the same 
fixation point, where relevant information for motor behaviour is the orientation of targets which 
are followed by a neutral mask that makes targets the only cue provided to participants.  
 
Summarizing, the following are the three main areas that bring us towards Leukel’s study rather 
than any other previous priming: 
-Targets represent the only triggering information, because masks have neutral meaning and 
because no previous or following cues are presented. 
-Response depends on stimuli orientation, specifically on the arrow’s direction.  
-Stimuli always occur at fixation, which make processing independent from gaze. Correct 
perception also depends only on stimuli orientation and it is not helped by different locations (see 
2.2.7.  Taylor’s protocol).  
In the presence of correct response rates that are higher than guessing probability, also at 
durations under the conscious threshold, and by taking into consideration the  three points above, 
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findings from Leukel’s experiment would constitute the “unproved evidence”, namely that fixed 
cues unconsciously perceived, are sufficient to trigger a correct motor response. This possibility 
may have some similarity with the capacity of unconsciously using relevant cues while playing an 
overt sport.  
 
Our experiment should therefore be considered an extension of Leukel’s research. In light of this, 
we will now report on this study in much more detail. This will help us to emphasize the 
similarities and differences between our experiment and theirs as well as provide us with a 
reference method.  
 
Leukel’s Methods. 
Participants (8 women, 3 men, aged 29 ± 5 years) were seated at a distance of 60 cm in front of a 
computer screen. The right hand of the subjects, resting on a start button, had to be lifted and 
moved forward to a target button placed 50 cm in front of the start button. 30 ms after pressing 
the start button, pointing arrows were shown to participants requiring the pressing of a target 
button or to stop the reaching movement. Less than 1 ms after the target cue, double pointing 
arrow of same color was displayed as a mask for 60 ms, after which a second double pointing 
arrow with different colors followed until next trial. The target and the first mask were dark blue 
on a light blue background, while the second mask was orange on a dark green background. 
Participants had to fixate on the spot where the cue was displayed while pressing the start button. 
If the arrow cue pointed upward, they had to reach and press the target button, otherwise for a 
downward pointing cue they had to stop the reaching movement resulting in no recorded 
response.  
 
Leukel’s experimental protocol. 
300 accustomization trials were performed, with 300 ms long cues requiring a reaching 
movement, in order to accustomize all participants with such easy consciously reportable trials. 
After the accustomization protocol 1, they “tested the ability of the subjects to make correct 
motor responses to visual cues with different display durations (Motor reaction)”. Following this, 
in protocol 2, they “tested the ability of the subjects to correctly verbalize the meaning of the 
visual cues with different display durations (Verbalization)”. This second protocol revealed what 
the individual threshold for conscious perception was for each participant . Correct verbal 
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responses at guessing rates indicates no conscious perception at that specific cue duration. 
Consequently, Leukel et al. “argued “that if subjects were able to perform the Motor reaction 
protocol correctly in the absence of conscious perception (tested in the Verbalization protocol), 
this would indicate the capability of the subjects to have correct action selection based on 
subconscious visual information.” 
 
Leukel’s results and discussion 
 
 
 
Fig. 13:  results demonstrated that at the two shortest display durations (20 ms and 40 ms) 
participants had significantly better percentages of correct answers in the motor protocol than in 
the verbalization task (Leukel et al., 2012). 
 
Based on these findings, they argued that “at these two short display durations, subjects were 
significantly more likely to make a correct motor response than to consciously perceive and 
verbalize the meaning of the visual cue”. Moreover, individual results indicated that at the display 
duration where conscious verbalization resulted in being purely guessed (50% right and wrong 
answers) subjects had significantly higher correct response rates in the motor trials. Overall and 
individual comparisons, between the verbal protocol entailing conscious perception and the motor 
task, led the authors to argue that subjects were able to choose the correct motor action in 
response to subconscious visual cues.  
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The researchers remarked that there was some similarity with Christensen’s results (see also pg. 
29-33), where corrections were also unconsciously performed but to the left or to the right. Leukel 
sees here the difference between his and their task, namely the fact that his task demanded either 
to stop or to complete the reaching action, while in Christensen’s study, participants were always 
asked to complete the reaching action. However in this latter task, unconscious cueing worked in 
the trials that required a correction either to the left or to the right. We emphasize the presence 
of a correction as evidence of a strong similarity between the two tasks, despite the fact that in 
the former the correction means stopping the reaching action, while in the latter the correction 
required a leftward or rightward reaching action. Christensen (Christensen et al., 2008) explained 
this unconscious corrective capacity as follows: ”our results suggest that the mechanism 
responsible for fast visually guided corrective movements lies outside visual cortex and that the 
visual signals used for correction of movements bypass visual cortex. There may be subcortical 
routes for visually guided reaching that bypass the cortical regions affected by TMS”. Leukel 
suggested that TMS could “manipulate consciousness per se” and conscious perception of the 
stimuli would be missed because of a lack of attention rather than because of V1 bypassing of 
visual input. In any case, correct motor behaviour in response to unperceived stimuli was observed 
in both Leukel’s and Christensen’s studies, for corrections during the reaching movement. The 
former study is more significant for us because no alteration to the normal functioning of the 
visual system was adopted and because cues were presented at fixation points followed by the 
neutral mask. No other information influenced upward or downward pointing arrows that were 
the sole cues which could determine movement correction. We still emphasize that the decision 
whether to complete the reaching movement or not was not made with limbs starting from a rest 
position, but while already in the process of movement as a correction.  
 
2.3. Hypothesis  
 
Leukel demonstrated that “solely in response of unconscious cues” humans can select correct 
decisions for a motor reaction. This was proved through an experiment where cue direction 
required either the completion or the stopping of the reaching movement. The decision should 
discriminate between whether the movement should be performed or not. We suspect that 
subliminal cues can lead to decision making not only between completing or stopping the 
movement, but also between rightward or leftward movements. We expect this because of  the 
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study of Eimer & Schlaghecken (1998) (presented in detail in section 2.2.4.). Here, LRP showed 
that unconsciously perceived priming arrows activated congruently either left or right index finger 
pressure on buttons placed just under participant’s fingertips. All motor responses were executed 
in response to consciously perceivable targets. This succession of primes and targets, that caused 
correct activation initiated by compatible primes, was then inhibited and caused reaction time 
costs while responding to the target. Further investigations of their researchers confirmed this 
kind of inhibition (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003) and regarding this they argued that “early 
response facilitation mediated by direct perceptuo-motor links is subsequently inhibited by a 
central mechanism operating to prevent behaviour from being controlled by irrelevant 
information” (M Eimer, 1999). Such mechanisms may also take subconscious cues such as 
“irrelevant information” into consideration, because participants were instructed to respond to 
the following target. In contrast to Leukel’s protocol, subliminal cues are the only relevant 
information presented to the participants. No inhibition would affect direct perceptuo-motor links 
if no irrelevant information is presented before the target which could lead to left or right 
response distinction, even at subconscious levels. In addition to successive studies, shorter 
reaction times instead of inhibition had been reported for primes preceding targets at closer 
intervals; this revealed a relationship between priming and target intervals and either response 
facilitation or affection (Schlaghecken, Bowman, & Eimer, 2006). 
 
Briefly, we hypothesize that unconsciously perceived visual cues can trigger correct action 
selection (as it occurred in Leukel’s experiment) but for movements to the left or to the right (as 
priming prompted them to the correct side in Eimer’s LRP observation).  
 
Our assumption mainly comes from Leukel’s and Eimer’s studies, that, as discussed above, suggest 
that unconscious stimuli can initiate response process (pg. 17-21) and that subliminal cues alone 
allows for correct motor reaction (pg. 24-28). Furthermore, our overview of both Blindsight and 
the organization of the visual system (pg.21-24) adds some general consistency to our hypothesis. 
Correct behaviours in response to visual stimuli about which we are not necessarily aware in order 
to solve different tasks are in fact widely reported and partially explained scientifically. The 
existence of direct visuomotor circuits that process visual stimuli without necessarily involving 
awareness is taken into account for several examples that reveal such evidence.   
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In addition to our hypothesis, we are also interested in investigating whether different motor tasks 
produce different results in response to subliminal cues. Since Leukel only tested one motor task 
and was the first to present subliminal cues alone as targets, we have no precise expectations for 
different results with different motor tasks. Nevertheless, we do know that a task involving either 
left or right limb movement is intrinsically different from a task always requiring a movement from 
the same limb. It is intrinsically understood that the former kind of task requires neuronal 
activation respectively on the left or right hemisphere of the motor cortex, whereas single hand 
action always requires motor cortex activation on the same side. Moreover, differences between 
bimanual or unimanual tasks have already been reported in subliminal priming experiments 
(Serrien, Sovijärvi-Spapé, & Rana, 2012). For instance, differences were noted mainly because of 
handedness dominance in relation to priming susceptibility.  
 
Finally, despite the fact that no precise supposition can be drawn about differences between tasks 
demanding unilateral or bilateral actions, these last points suggest that it is important to also use a 
protocol involving both hands. Two separated motor protocols were therefore presented to 
participants in order to reveal the possible differences in subliminal motor behaviours related to 
differences in the types of action.  
 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Participants 
 
No neurological disorders were known for the eleven participants (2 women, 9 men, aged 27.4 ± 
6.4, mean ± STD). All participants were also considered healthy, and all of them had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. They were all right handed, a fact that avoids possible differences 
owing to left-handedness, as discussed in the Oldfield handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971). 
Participants became verbally informed about procedural aspects of the experiment and then filled 
out an information sheet. The study was performed according to the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) 
and approved by the local ethics committee of the canton of Freiburg (014-CER-FR).  
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3.2. Experimental procedure 
 
The experiment was composed of four protocols: one accustomization protocol, ”accust.” protocol 
“0”; the “motor” protocol, “1”; the ”verbal” protocol, “2” and the “sport” protocol, “3”. 
A computer screen (17 inch, Dell E170S) was placed about 50 cm in front of the participants that 
were seated in protocols 0, 1, 2 and standing up in protocol 3.  
In protocol 0 and 1, the participant’s right hand was placed on a three-button board. The three 
buttons on the board (3 mm long x 3 mm wide) were placed on a horizontal line 3 cm apart, the 
button in the middle was light blue while the left and right buttons were red. The central blue 
button was used as the start button in protocols 0 and 1. The pressing with the index finger of this 
central button produced a TTL-pulse and triggered a custom-built software programme (LabView 
based, National Instruments, Austin, Texas), which was used to present the visual cues. In protocol 
2, participants held in the right hand another single start button (5 mm long x 5 mm wide) while in 
protocol 3, light barriers were used to trigger the visual signal. 20 ms after the trigger, a 3 cm long 
by 6.1 cm wide target cue (leftward or rightward arrow) was displayed in the middle of the 
computer screen. The colour of the target cue was dark blue, and the background colour was light 
blue. This method of colour selection was suggested by Leukel “In a preliminary study, we tested 
the combination of different cue, mask, and background colours on conscious perception. We 
found that, at a fixed display duration, this combination of colours served best to degrade 
conscious perception of the target cue”. Contrast between background and target is of course not 
enough to make them unaware, but them duration have to be shortened at few milliseconds. 
After the target cue (whose duration is one of the twelve target durations) four dark blue triangles 
on a light blue background were displayed around the cue’s spot as a neutral mask for a duration 
of 100 ms. This first mask was followed by an orange double pointing (leftwards and rightwards at 
the same time) arrow on a dark background. Subjects were instructed to fixate on this starting 
neutral double arrow (specifically at the point where the target cue would have been displayed) 
while triggering the target cue. Twelve different target cue durations ranged from 8.33 ms to 100 
ms, target cue duration being the relevant variable across trials. Subjects were asked to respond as 
quickly as possible after the cue’s appearance, and responses were recorded by pressing one of 
the two red buttons on the board. Pressing one of the buttons resulted in an electric square pulse 
that was recorded for offline-analysis (LabView based, National InstrumentsH, Austin, Texas). 
During accustomization and in protocol 1, participants had to press either the left or the right red 
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button with the index finger, in response respectively to a left or a right pointing arrow cue. In 
protocols 2 and 3, the researcher pressed the red buttons to record the participant’s verbal 
response in protocol 2 (by saying left or right respectively) and. The upper limb motion response 
(to the left or to the right) in protocol 3 was recorded equally.  
 
3.3. Experimental protocols.  
 
60 accustomization trials were first performed. Here the cues were long enough (300 ms) to allow 
for easy conscious perception so that participants could get used to giving correct responses by 
pressing the red target button. The “motor” protocol (“1”) tested the ability to select between left 
or right movements of the index finger of the same hand, triggered by the visual target but using 
stimulus durations between 8 ms and 100 ms. Similarly, the “sport” protocol (“3”) tested the 
motor action selection ability, but differently from protocol “1” in that it involves either the left or 
right hand. “Verbal” protocol “2” tested at which stimuli duration participants were able to 
verbally report the arrow’s direction correctly; this will provide us with the individual conscious 
detection threshold.  
 
Comparing the verbal protocol to the other two protocols will indicate whether the subliminal 
action selection between go or stop demonstrated by Leukel, also occurs for choosing between 
left or right movement. In other words, it will indicate whether correct action selection based on 
subconscious visual information is possible when choosing between leftwards or rightwards 
movements. This would be demonstrated if correct motor response rates are above chance rates 
at stimuli durations where correct verbal responses are at chance rates.  
 
In addition to this, different results among “motor” and “sport” protocols may reveal a 
relationship between decision making that is dependent on subliminal cues and the specificity of 
the task. Moreover, differences between leftwards and rightwards correct response rates of the 
single “sport” protocol, may indicate a relationship between decision making that is dependent on 
subliminal cues and the handedness dominance or perhaps other aspects related to limb’s side.   
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Motor protocol 
For this protocol, participants were seated about 50 cm in front of the computer screen, with their 
right arm stretched to the table, and with the right arm leaning on the board while the index 
finger moved from the central button either to the one on the left or right. The motor protocol 
required participants to apply pressure to the left button in response to a left pointing arrow or 
right button pressure to a right pointing arrow. Participants decided autonomously when to trigger 
the cues by applying pressure to the central button that allowed self-paced trial succession, 
nevertheless, software (STIMULI) prevented intervals between triggers of less than 1.5 seconds. 
Before beginning this protocol, we gave participants the following instructions: “In some trials you 
will probably feel as if no arrow was shown, but an arrow will always come after your trigger. In 
any case, try to give the correct response that you feel is right. Do not skip giving a response. Also 
do not give a random response and do not try to guess. Just make an immediate spontaneous 
decision whether to press the right or the left button”.  
 
 
Fig. 14: in the motor task, a participant is triggering the target by pressing the central blue button 
on the board before pressing either the left or right button in response to the arrow’s direction. 
Verbal protocol  
Participants were seated about 50 cm in front of the computer screen, with their right arm placed 
wherever they liked because hand-held button had a wire that enabled free positioning of the 
arms. The verbal protocol required participants to state the orientation of the arrows just by 
saying “left” for left pointing arrows or “right” for  those pointing to the right. Participants held a 
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triggering button in their right hand and decided autonomously when to trigger the cues by 
pressing it; this also allowed for self-paced trial succession, software (STIMULI) prevented intervals 
between triggers of less than 1.5 seconds. Before beginning this protocol, we gave participants the 
following instructions: “In some trials you will probably feel as if no arrow was shown, but an 
arrow will always come after your trigger. In any case, try to give the correct response that you 
feel is right. Do not skip giving a response. Also do not give a random response and do not try to 
guess. Just make an immediate spontaneous decision whether to press the right or the left 
button”. 
 
 
Fig. 15: in the verbal protocol, a participant is triggering the target by pressing the button in his 
hand before saying either “left” or “right” to report the arrow’s orientation. The researcher is ready 
to record participant’s verbal response with the button board. 
Sport protocol 
Participants stood about 50 cm in front of the computer screen and about 20 cm behind two light 
barriers placed at 50 cm above the ground. Participants had to move both arms together from the 
bottom up through the light barriers which triggered the cue. After triggering, the sport protocol 
required participants to move either the left or the right arm upwards in response respectively to 
a left or right pointing. Participants decided autonomously when to move across barriers, this also 
allowed for self-paced trial succession, but software (STIMULI) prevented intervals between 
triggers of less than 2 seconds in order to prevent unwanted triggers. Before beginning this 
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protocol, we gave participants following instructions: “In some trials you will probably feel as if no 
arrow was shown, but an arrow will always come after your trigger. In any case, try to give the 
correct response that you feel is right. Do not skip giving a response. Also do not give a random 
response and do not try to guess. Just make an immediate spontaneous decision whether to press 
the right or the left button.” 
 
 
Fig. 16: in the sport task, a participant triggers the target by hand lifting between the photocells 
(image 1 and 2) and responds either with a right or left hand movement (image 3). 
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For each protocol, four blocks of 72 trials were presented with 2 minutes pause between each of 
them. The duration of the displayed arrows ranged between 1 and 12 frames, the screen refresh 
rate, as indicated by the manufacturer, is 120 frames per second, cue durations also varied as 
follows: 8.33 ms, 16.66 ms, 25 ms, 33.33 ms, 41.66, ms, 50 ms, 58.33 ms, 66.66 ms, 75 ms, 83.33 
ms, 91.66 ms, 100 ms. These twelve different stimuli durations for the left and right pointing 
arrows, represent twenty-four different conditions that were equally distributed across each 
single block (consisting of 72 trials), but in random succession. In order to test the effective 
duration of each cue, we placed a 3 x 3 cm solar cell on the screen spot just under where the 
arrows appeared, recording screen light changes. More precisely, the light changes detector was 
placed where one of the four triangles of the neutral mask would have appeared after the target. 
This triangle was dark blue and was preceded by a light blue background surrounding the arrows.  
 
Fig. 17: display succession. 
 
 
3.4. Data analysis and statistics 
 
To test whether the number of correct responses was significantly different between the three 
different conditions, a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was used with the within-subject 
factors condition (Motor reaction versus the Verbalization and versus the Sport protocol) and 
display duration (20 ms, 40 ms, 60 ms, 80 ms, 100 ms, 120 ms, and 160 ms) [condition (3) * display 
duration (12)]. In case of significant results from the ANOVA, post-hoc (Bonferroni) corrected 
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paired student T-tests were used to indicate differences between the three conditions for each of 
the display durations. For instance, a condition * duration interaction effect. 
 
4. Results  
 
The ANOVA indicated that the number of correct responses differed between the twelve display 
durations (duration effect: F11;110=28.42; p<0.001).  However, we did not find any significant 
differences between the three conditions (Condition effect: F2;20=2.31; p=0.13). In addition, we did 
not find an interaction effect between conditions and display duration (Condition*duration effect: 
F22;220=1.22; p=0.23). 
 
      
Trials without responses were not taken into account. 
Each trial had been recorded respectively as correct “OK” (the participant’s response matched the  
direction of the arrow), erroneous “ER” (wrong response) or  “No Answer”7 for targets that did not 
receive a response. In any case, regardless of whether we speak about the number of errors or 
correct responses, a “blank” response would influence the results either as correct or incorrect 
depending on the responses we are considering. For instance, if we have 6 correct answers out of 
10 trials, the percentage says that we have a 60 % of correct response rate; however, the 
remaining 40 % is not made up of just errors but sometimes also of non-responses trials. 
Automatically counting blank trials as errors or as correct responses could be misleading, because 
we cannot know whether the participant would have responded correctly or not. Furthermore, we 
do not know whether a blank response is caused by the participant’s uncertainty, which caused a 
voluntary incorrect answer (despite the fact they were asked to always attempt to give a response 
even if they had no idea about arrow’s orientation), or if it is caused by technical problem which 
prevented the recording of the response.  
                                                          
7
 In excel and final tables we called the “blank” trials “No anwers”, whereas they were called “blank” or “no response” 
in the whole document. 
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Fig. 18: only for the verbal task, the number of blank responses in trials increases with the 
shortening of the stimuli duration. A significant increase blank responses in trials for the verbal 
protocol is noticed between the durations of 41.67 ms and 25 ms.  
 
Because of the relationship between stimulus length and the amount of blank responsesin the 
verbal protocol, we suggest that they are more due to uncertainty than technical problems8. We 
maintain this because the blank trials tend to increase with the difficulty of perceiving the stimuli. 
Participants appear to give no response when they are less able to report the stimuli consciously, 
specifically, at a display duration where correct response rates approaches guess rates (around 50 
%). In any case, this fact does not necessarily mean that they would have responded correctly, 
rather we are investigating the possibility that participants can still respond correctly despite the 
fact that the stimuli had been successfully processed without consciousness. However, we cannot 
consider trials without responses as either correct or incorrect because we are only interested in 
the participant’s direct and spontaneous responses without any conscious decision. Not 
responding because of uncertainty is of course a conscious decision. It is also important to 
                                                          
8 We did not find any direct evidence of technical problems while testing for the recorded participants. 
Nevertheless, it may have occurred that some responses were not recorded even though participants or 
the researcher (for verbal and sport protocol), pressed the button. Such missing response attempts could 
be due to insufficient pressure on the button, electrical connections (cables) or software standby.  
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emphasize here that the relationship between stimuli perception difficulty and trials without 
responses exists and that this is evident just for the verbal protocol, that is, the protocol where all 
participants’ answers are presumed to be always consciously given. 
In conclusion regarding how to consider the blank trials, they will be considered as No trials. This is 
right also for those blank trials caused by technical problems, obviously because no one knows 
whether the response missed by the machinery was correct or not. We therefore decided to omit 
all No response trials, and simply calculate the percentage of correct answers on the total trials 
(for the same stimuli length) excluding those missing.  
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Fig. 19: Graphic representation of our overall results shows the same tendency for the three 
protocols, namely, performance drops progressively with the shortening of the stimuli’s duration. 
In addition, verbal tasks had, at almost all durations, a higher correct response rate, (the overall 
percentage of correct responses is 78% for the verbal, 72% for the motor and 73% for the sport 
protocol). 
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5. Discussion  
 
Regarding our hypothesis 
We confirmed that the length of the stimulus can affect correct responses, as occurred in Leukel’s 
experiment. A decrease in cue display duration was directly correlated with a decrease in the 
amount of correct responses. The method used to reduce the cue’s duration in order to prevent 
conscious perception worked. However, in the verbal protocol (where all responses are supposed 
to have been consciously given) just 8.3 ms stimuli resulted in purely guessed responses (50 % 
correct) while in Leukel’s experiment this already occurred at the duration of 40 ms and 20 ms. 
Different hypotheses can be drawn to explain what made our participants more able to correctly 
verbalize stimuli orientation at very short durations. First, stimuli durations were not exactly the 
same. Second, there was some difference in display settings between our experiment and 
Leukel’s, namely the starting background colour and the neutral mask. Furthermore, such 
differences between our results and theirs could be accounted for because of a discrepancy 
between the real duration and the duration reported by the software, as we will discuss below. It 
may also be the case that up or down arrow orientation is easier to distinguish than left or right 
pointing, revealing a different perception of the same form depending on spatial orientation. It is 
of course possible that our participants had better capacities. In any case, contrary to Leukel, we 
do not know whether incorrect verbal responses were totally unperceived or just consciously non-
reportable. He claimed to have demonstrated the latter possibility by reason of the motor task 
that allowed for correct responses at higher rates than guessing at stimuli durations where 
consciously (verbally) this was not possible. Nevertheless, our results show no difference between 
the implicit (motor and sport) and the explicit (verbal) protocol. While our results were unable to  
confirm Leukel’s main assumption, we are ready to point out many doubts about our experiment 
rather than discredit his findings. Despite the fact that our data disconfirms his results, we are still 
inclined to support his findings because of at least two prior considerations. First, the effective 
number of certain consciously (verbal) perceived responses is still at the chance rate at the display 
duration of 60 ms. -Leukel gave participants the possibility to distinguish between certain or 
uncertain verbal answers ( “I guess left/right” if they were not sure about the arrow orientation).- 
From this point of view, between his correct motor responses and the verbal responses at the 
three lowest durations, the gap is still larger, which makes Leukel’s discovery even more evident. 
Second, his findings are already supported by several assumptions mentioned in our introduction, 
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suggesting that visual stimuli that are not consciously reported are somehow nevertheless 
perceived and in many cases operating on cognitive and motor processes. In addition to this, in 
our experiment, for the verbal protocol, cues were definitely consciously unperceived only at the 
duration of 8.3 ms. In fact, even at the duration of 16.6 ms in the verbal task, participants had a 
correct response rate of 58 %, and while small, this nevertheless represents a significant difference 
when compared to the rate for no perception (50%). In Leukel, 40 ms long cues were still not 
verbally reportable, while the overall conscious perception threshold is significantly much lower 
(16.6 ms) in our experiment. As said above, the main discrepancies  between our results and theirs 
could be explained, in part, by different experimental details. 
Memory extinction or conscious control over spontaneous decisions 
In order to prevent memory extinction of the perceived targets, whereas a very short delay could 
cause at least partial suppression of information storage, Leukel’s participants had to verbalize a 
cue’s orientation within 1 second (a tone came 1 s after cue was displayed). Despite the fact that 
we did not force our subject to a quick verbalisation, memory extinction should not have 
influenced the verbal task which had higher correct response rates almost at all display durations 
compared with motor tasks. Consequently, because of the better results in the verbal protocol, we 
suspect that memory extinction may have influenced the motor and the sport trials. In fact, our 
participants were instructed to give an immediate spontaneous response but no other constraint 
other than the instructions prevented them from consciously manipulating their motor responses. 
In Leukel’s motor tasks, targets where presented while the subject had already started moving. 
This type of protocol implies that participant’s motor response was a corrective reaction and not a 
decision made from rest as with our subjects.   
Christensen’s (et al., 2008) experiment suggests the idea that subconscious selection is possible 
even for left or right movement choice. The use of TMS in his protocols, in order to suppress 
conscious visual perception, makes comparison between our experiment and theirs unlikely. 
However, as already highlighted in the previous paragraph, his task also demanded a correction 
rather than a pure decision. Finally, the fact that our participants started the movement from rest 
is suspected to have prevented participants from being influenced by the targets perceived below 
the conscious threshold. In the presence of unperceived targets, at rest, without any other 
constraint forcing participants to respond immediately after cues appear, they may have felt 
uncertain and tried to guess the arrow’s direction, and thereby avoided the spontaneous 
response. Even if the memory of the unconsciously perceived information is not already extinct, 
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this would be ignored in favor of an independent decision. According to the results, the cueing, 
about which subjects seem to be unaware (8.33 ms), does not seem to become relevant for 
decisions whether to move to the left or to the right.   
By reason of what has already been considered, the aspect that separates our experiment and 
Leukel’s, is the kind of motor response taken at rest and while moving in a corrective manner 
respectively. We suggest that unconscious visual discrimination, whether moving to the left or to 
the right, may be demonstrated if tested in a corrective way.  
Non demonstrable unconscious influence 
Regarding movement initiated from the rest position, after examining the graphs of our individual 
performances at critical durations, only one subject appears to partially show the hypothesized 
results. 
 
 
Fig. 20: subject 18 had two target durations around the chance rate (50 %) in the verbal task: 16.67 
ms (47.6 %) and 8.33 (47.3 %) ms. In the motor protocol, at the former stimuli duration, he 
responded correctly at a quite higher rate (61.5 %), while for the latter he was just slightly better 
(54.5 %). 
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However, this was an isolated case and likely occurred by pure chance. In fact, no other participant 
showed similar behaviour. 
On the other hand, regarding all participants, we do not know whether some motor or sport 
correct responses were in fact given unconsciously, that is, even if the verbal task revealed 
conscious perception of the targets at the same duration. Furthermore, in the verbal task, subjects 
were aware of the direction they were saying but does this necessarily mean that they have 
consciously perceived the arrow? The systematic link between verbalization and conscious 
perception had been taken from Leukel’s assumptions, but this represents a significant doubt for 
our experimental procedure. He has already remarked that verbalization also requires muscular 
activation, but dependent on speech areas rather than motor areas as for a limb response. 
Therefore, if direct visuomotor links between the visual system and motor areas bypassing 
consciousness exist (as largely discussed in the introduction) similar connections between vision 
and speech areas may have determined unconscious verbalization. The argument against this 
possibility is that verbalization is under conscious control and that no arrow direction would be 
pronounced without being filtered. Still, despite conscious control, the verbalised arrow direction 
could be cued unconsciously; participants feel they have consciously seen the target while there is 
really only awareness of what is being  reported. We suspect this because of two considerations. 
On the one hand, our results show rates above guessing at shorter durations compared to Leukel 
for the verbal task. Nevertheless, if we look at the blank trials (fig. 15) as an index of uncertainty -
because blank verbal trials increase together with perception difficulty of the shorter durations 
(we note a significant drop below the duration of 41.67 ms. Similarly, Leukel observed 
performance drops to guess rates at the duration of 40 ms for verbalization.). - On the other hand, 
the trend in our results is that correct verbal response rates are higher than guessing even at the 
duration of 33.33 ms, 25 ms and 16.66 ms. Both considerations together could speak in favor of 
conscious verbalization unconsciously cued by the targets. Why this effect did not occur with 
Leukel’s participants may depend on the possibility they had to report “I guess up/down” which 
makes them aware of the uncertainty and blocked the unconscious cueing that could correctly 
influence verbalization. Suspected overlapping between unconscious cueing and conscious 
reporting is certainly fascinating and suggests the need for further research based on experiments 
with targets presented too quickly for conscious perception. However, in order to understand 
whether unconscious perception does or does not influence verbalization in such tasks, we 
suggest that only neuroimaging techniques, or at least LRP, may reveal answers unequivocally.  
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Methodological limitations 
In any case, even if we agree with the assumptions which influenced the design of the 
experimental procedure, this presents other reasons for doubts regarding procedures. For 
instance, we must admit that the accustomization blocks may have been too short to prepare 
participants for the motor task. This was sufficient to make them understand what they had to do, 
but even though the task was simple, they may not have developed enough automaticity to 
prevent conscious control of the action. (It would be interesting to give participants a practice 
period before the tests in order to check whether automaticity could facilitate unconscious 
answering.) Furthermore, no accustomization block prepared participants for the sport task. 
However, since no significant differences between the results of the three conditions were found, 
this implies that there is no particular dependence on the type of the motor task (72 % of overall 
correct answers in motor protocols and 73.2 % in sport protocols). This reveals that performance, 
for one index finger and for either the left or right hand respectively, drops at the same duration 
of the presented target and no kind of action causes motor response facilitation or affection.  
In our experiment, still at a duration of 33.33 ms, correct responses were above 60 % while in 
Leukel’s experiment, at 40 ms responses were already at chance rates, despite the fact that the 
target’s design and distance from the screen were almost the same. We therefore suspect that the 
real duration of the targets displayed on our screen did not correspond to the duration indicated 
by the software. In order to record the real duration of the target for each trial, we tried to use a 
solar cell placed on the screen which unfortunately did not function properly. On the other hand, 
results do show a precise trend related to display duration which could not represent any random 
manipulation of the supposed length by the screen. If real stimuli durations were perturbed by the 
screen, this occurred either for very short time durations or in the same manner for all durations. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In our lengthy introduction, we hypothesized that unconscious perceived cues alone could 
determinate decision making whether to move the index finger to the left or to the right or 
whether to raise the left or right arm. Such expected results have not been confirmed 
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independently of action type. We therefore conclude that visual targets which remain consciously 
unperceived do not permit decision making whether to move left or rightwards from a resting 
position. 
However, Leukel was able to demonstrate the possibility to correct a movement during its 
execution in response to an unconscious perceived cue. In particular, the purpose of our research 
was to investigate whether humans can decide to move from a state of rest9 sideways to the left 
or right, in response to either left or right pointing arrows made consciously unperceivable by the 
rapidity of their appearance. –Such a method was confirmed to be working; decreasing the 
durations of the displayed stimuli made some trials subliminal-. In any case, unconscious correct 
motor behaviour remains demonstrated only for movement inhibition in response to downward 
pointing unconsciously perceived arrows, according to Leukel’s research. Furthermore, we admit 
to having doubts regarding our specific experimental procedure, mainly because anything other 
than instructions forced participants to respond without conscious control of their motor 
decisions. Additionally, we also opened the discussion regarding the real degree of consciousness 
in all protocols of both experiments. Finally, we have argued that the influences of the cues 
displayed at critical durations could be better investigated through neuroimaging, or at least LRP.  
 
6.1. Looking Ahead 
 
At least four main unanswered questions remain:  
 
Would left-right choices have been demonstrated if they had been tested in a corrective way? 
-For example, exploring a movement that does not start from rest but left-right targets appear 
while moving, requiring a related correction of the movement, as examined in a previously 
mentioned study (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998).  
 
                                                          
9
 Before moving in response to the target, participants pressed the start button or passed their hands through 
photocells. This could be interpreted as the participants not being at rest. Nevertheless, we suggest that such limb-
motion after having triggered the target, simply occurs because they were not instructed to stop all movement 
between triggering and responding. Therefore, the latent movement derived from the triggering should have neutral 
influence. In fact, we observed that the finger (in protocol 1) and hands (in protocol 3) continued to lift up, 
perpendicular to the triggering button/spot without pointing rightwards or leftwards before responding to the target.  
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Were correct unconscious motor responses inhibited because nothing forced subjects to make a 
spontaneous decision which would have been blocked by uncertainty? 
 
Were some unconscious motor responses correct thanks to direct visuomotor interaction?  
-This may have been the case in some individual trials, even though this does not emerge from our 
experimental procedure that was based on overall data comparison between protocols, and could 
not reveal what really happened on each trial. 
 
For short durations in the verbal task, did subjects consciously report the orientation of the arrows 
correctly thanks to the influence of unconscious perception? 
-In other words, they were aware of what they reported but not of what they perceived and this 
influenced the report.- 
 
Naturally, we hope that we or other researchers will have the possibility to investigate these areas 
in future studies. As said above, the main doubt that we wished to resolve remains despite our 
research, namely, whether a movement starting from rest can be triggered by cues that are 
unconsciously perceived, and whether this can determine decision making between left or 
rightwards action. Nevertheless, before further exploration of these areas, another attempt 
should be made to clarify the real degrees of conscious perception and its implications for verbal 
or motor responses to subliminal visual stimuli presented alone. As already stated above, 
advanced technology can enable the investigation of our cerebral activities, and may be able to 
provide concrete evidence in these areas. We also hope that researchers with access to such 
technology will be interested in unconscious triggering of movements. Further contributions in 
this area could orient our approach to overt sports in different ways. The capacity to notice the 
orientation of a single cue fixed in the environment in order to select an action in response to this, 
could suggest that a single piece of information could be relevant for decision making while 
playing. Otherwise, other individual aspects in the observed ongoing conditions would be 
necessary for correct motor behaviour in response to the situation. Of course, it seems evident 
that decision making for motor responses in overt sport conditions involves more neuronal 
resources processing several of the observed aspects at the same time, while in the laboratory we 
can only isolate and prove a few of them together. Nevertheless, the sum total of small scientific 
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contributions will add to our knowledge of such complex interaction, which may help us to 
understand how things occur in the real world.   
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Results in % of the MOTOR task  
  
     Duration 100.00 91.67 83.33 75.00 
Right-Left 24-23 22-21 20-19 18-17 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 100 91.66666667 91.66666667 87.5 
2 100 100 100 100 
3 95.83333333 100 100 100 
4 95.65217391 80.95238095 73.91304348 52.63157895 
5 31.57894737 100 68.42105263 73.68421053 
6 70.83333333 78.94736842 76.19047619 87.5 
7 100 86.95652174 70.83333333 77.27272727 
8 83.33333333 94.44444444 86.36363636 77.77777778 
9 31.57894737 70.58823529 50 42.85714286 
10 73.91304348 86.95652174 65.2173913 75 
11 91.66666667 100 95.83333333 87.5 
TOT 79.48997989 90.04655811 79.85808485 78.33849431 
     Duration 66.67 58.33 50.00 41.67 
Right-Left 16-15 14-13 12-11 10-9 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 73.91304348 54.16666667 50 45.83333333 
2 100 100 95.83333333 79.16666667 
3 100 100 91.66666667 81.81818182 
4 61.9047619 79.16666667 86.95652174 60.86956522 
5 54.54545455 80 90.47619048 62.5 
6 70.83333333 66.66666667 82.60869565 70.83333333 
7 76.47058824 73.33333333 71.42857143 66.66666667 
8 90.90909091 78.26086957 62.5 69.56521739 
9 35 80 86.95652174 79.16666667 
10 73.91304348 66.66666667 85 52.17391304 
11 75 79.16666667 87.5 62.5 
TOT 73.86266508 77.94795784 80.99331828 66.46304947 
     Duration 33.33 25.00 16.67 8.33 
Right-Left 8-7 6-5 4-3 2-1 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 65.2173913 60.86956522 33.33333333 45.83333333 
2 70.83333333 79.16666667 54.16666667 45.83333333 
3 86.36363636 42.85714286 38.0952381 63.15789474 
4 75 69.56521739 52.38095238 42.85714286 
5 95.23809524 58.82352941 61.53846154 54.54545455 
6 60.86956522 73.91304348 54.16666667 34.7826087 
7 41.17647059 35.29411765 68.42105263 57.89473684 
8 60.86956522 78.26086957 52.38095238 69.56521739 
9 95.23809524 80 61.53846154 54.54545455 
10 65 63.15789474 52.38095238 25 
11 69.56521739 62.5 54.16666667 50 
TOT 71.39739726 64.03709518 52.96085493 49.45592512 
     TOT correct MOTOR answers% 77.88279489 
   
72 
 
Results in % of the VERBAL task 
  
     Duration 100.00 91.67 83.33 75.00 
Right-Left 24-23 22-21 20-19 18-17 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 93.75 94.44444444 94.44444444 100 
2 95.83333333 100 100 95.83333333 
3 85 90 100 100 
4 100 100 91.30434783 91.30434783 
5 100 95.83333333 91.66666667 95.83333333 
6 100 100 100 100 
7 52.38095238 95.65217391 91.66666667 90.47619048 
8 75 79.16666667 73.91304348 62.5 
9 95.83333333 95.83333333 91.66666667 95.65217391 
10 59.09090909 52.17391304 56.52173913 64 
11 91.66666667 95.83333333 95.83333333 91.66666667 
TOT 86.23229044 90.81247255 89.72880984 89.75145869 
     Duration 66.67 58.33 50.00 41.67 
Right-Left 16-15 14-13 12-11 10-9 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 77.77777778 73.33333333 83.33333333 60 
2 100 100 91.66666667 78.26086957 
3 100 100 100 80 
4 85.71428571 84.21052632 81.81818182 72.22222222 
5 100 95.83333333 73.91304348 70.83333333 
6 100 100 92.30769231 100 
7 95.23809524 90 100 76.47058824 
8 66.66666667 69.56521739 54.16666667 59.09090909 
9 95.83333333 90.90909091 95.45454545 88 
10 63.63636364 69.56521739 60 58.33333333 
11 91.66666667 87.5 83.33333333 66.66666667 
TOT 88.77574446 87.35606533 83.27213301 73.62526568 
     Duration 33.33 25.00 16.67 8.33 
Right-Left 8-7 6-5 4-3 2-1 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 56.25 66.66666667 68.75 56.25 
2 75 79.16666667 75 66.66666667 
3 66.66666667 100 75 50 
4 86.66666667 60 64.28571429 50 
5 35 45.83333333 62.5 58.33333333 
6 84.61538462 75 25 33.33333333 
7 68.42105263 52.94117647 62.5 36.36363636 
8 54.54545455 63.63636364 54.54545455 45 
9 96 65 47.61904762 47.36842105 
10 95.83333333 50 50 52.17391304 
11 66.66666667 62.5 54.16666667 54.16666667 
TOT 71.42411138 65.52220062 58.1242621 49.96872459 
     TOT correct VERBAL answers%  72.07094836 
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Results in % of the SPORT task 
  
     Duration 100.00 91.67 83.33 75.00 
Right-Left 24-23 22-21 20-19 18-17 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 91.66666667 100 83.33333333 75 
2 100 100 100 100 
3 100 100 100 100 
4 100 100 100 100 
5 100 100 79.16666667 100 
6 100 94.44444444 95.23809524 88.88888889 
7 87.5 95.83333333 82.60869565 95.83333333 
8 83.33333333 77.27272727 78.26086957 64 
9 91.66666667 86.95652174 66.66666667 79.16666667 
10 86.95652174 77.77777778 72.72727273 68 
11 62.5 70.83333333 75 50 
TOT 91.23847167 91.19255799 84.81832726 83.71717172 
     Duration 66.67 58.33 50.00 41.67 
Right-Left 16-15 14-13 12-11 10-9 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 66.66666667 66.66666667 41.66666667 33.33333333 
2 100 100 100 83.33333333 
3 100 91.30434783 87.5 95.45454545 
4 89.47368421 100 88.23529412 78.26086957 
5 88.88888889 75 66.66666667 94.73684211 
6 80.95238095 80 65 63.15789474 
7 91.30434783 91.66666667 87.5 84.21052632 
8 76 75 77.27272727 73.68421053 
9 95.83333333 83.33333333 79.16666667 78.94736842 
10 75 69.56521739 66.66666667 54.16666667 
11 54.16666667 25 45.83333333 58.33333333 
TOT 83.48054259 77.95783926 73.22800194 72.51081125 
     Duration 33.33 25.00 16.67 8.33 
Right-Left 8-7 6-5 4-3 2-1 
Subject % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers % Correct answers 
1 58.33333333 66.66666667 33.33333333 41.66666667 
2 70.83333333 79.16666667 58.33333333 50 
3 69.56521739 39.13043478 52.17391304 56.52173913 
4 71.42857143 61.9047619 52.38095238 50 
5 71.42857143 61.9047619 57.89473684 52.63157895 
6 47.82608696 52.63157895 40 38.0952381 
7 62.5 29.16666667 54.16666667 66.66666667 
8 42.10526316 76.92307692 47.05882353 42.10526316 
9 75 66.66666667 50 50 
10 69.56521739 47.61904762 56.25 55 
11 54.16666667 41.66666667 50 54.16666667 
TOT 62.97747828 56.67699958 50.14470538 50.62307448 
     TOT correct SPORT answers % :  73.21383178 
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